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STEALING SECRETS: COMMUNISM AND
SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THE 1940s
ELLEN SCHRECKER'
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War liberated
thousands of pages of previously secret records. Coming from
both sides of the former Iron Curtain, these materials have greatly
expanded what is known about the long-hidden world of Soviet
policymaking. The most sensational of those releases dealt with
the Kremlin's espionage operations at the time of the World War
II, revealing that somewhere between one and three hundred
Americans and others gave information to Soviet intelligence
agencies and that the Communist Party officials recruited many of
these people. This Article examines this new material in order to
understand espionage and the questions it raises about individual
loyalty and disloyalty. It explores the activities of the main
espionage networks and assesses the motivations of many
intelligent and idealistic men and women who willingly entered the
murky world of passwords, covernames, secret cameras, and all
the other accoutrements of tradecraft or conspiracy that KGB
operations required. This Article also looks at the kinds of
information these people transferred and the ways in which that
information may have affected Soviet behavior, and thus, shaped
the course of world events. Finally, it explores the broader
questions of loyalty and disloyalty involved. The Cold War and its
triumphal ending has made it possible to treat the Soviet spies in
terms of black and white, but, as this Article hopes to show, by
adding a few more colors to the palette, the story becomes more
complicated and more troubling.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been more than fifty years since Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg went to their deaths in the electric chair at Sing Sing State
Penitentiary. Julius, it is now definitely known, was deeply enmeshed
in industrial spying for the Soviet Union.' During the 1940s, he
coordinated the espionage activities of a group of young, left-wing
scientists and engineers who were passing technical information to
the Russians.2 Rosenberg became involved with atomic espionage
when his wife's brother, David Greenglass, was sent to Los Alamos,
New Mexico, to work on the atomic bomb.3 Arrested in the summer
of 1950, after a top-secret counter-intelligence operation known as
VENONA deciphered some KGB4 telegrams describing his activities,
Rosenberg refused to confess.' Because the decrypted Soviet cables
1. In 1995, the National Security Agency's release of the so-called VENONA
telegrams revealed the extent of Soviet espionage during World War II. These telegrams,
which contained correspondence between Soviet intelligence operatives in the United
States and their home office in Moscow, were deciphered in a top-secret project that
lasted from the late 1940s until the 1960s. These messages alerted the United States
government to the espionage activities of Julius Rosenberg and dozens of other American
Communists. See NAT'L SECURITY AGENCY, VENONA FILES, at http://www.nsa.gov/
venona/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); see also VENONA: SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE, 1938-
1957, at xxvi-xlii (Robert Louis Benson & Michael Warner eds., 1996) [hereinafter
VENONA] (providing a useful compendium of these materials); ALLEN WEINSTEIN &
ALEXANDER VASSILIEV, THE HAUNTED WOOD passim (1999) (providing the most
useful overall study of Soviet espionage in the United States).
2. For a narrative account of Rosenberg's espionage, see generally ALEXANDER
FEKLISOV & SERGEI KOSTIN, THE MAN BEHIND THE ROSENBERGS (2001).
3. SAM ROBERTS, THE BROTHER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF ATOMIC SPY DAVID
GREENGLASS AND How HE SENT HIS SISTER, ETHEL ROSENBERG, TO THE ELECTRIC
CHAIR 82-83 (2001).
4. The name of the Soviet Union's intelligence agency changed several times over
the course of its history. Originally known as Cheka, it was later called, among other
acronyms, the NKVD, MGB, NKGB, and KGB. See CHRISTOPHER ANDREW & VASILI
MITROKHIN, THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD: THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE AND THE
SECRET HISTORY OF THE KGB (1999) (providing a list of acronyms and time periods).
This Article will sacrifice historical accuracy for clarity and will refer to it as KGB
throughout.
5. See RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE 335 (1983)
(explaining that "despite their deteriorating legal situation," Julius and Ethel refused to
confess). Radosh and Milton provide the most comprehensive study of the Rosenberg
case, and despite its exaggerated spin, the book does seem to be an accurate account.
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were deemed too sensitive to be produced in a courtroom, the Justice
Department decided to prosecute Ethel in the hopes that, as the
assistant attorney general in charge of the case explained, "it might be
possible to utilize her as a lever against her husband. ' When that
tactic failed, the government escalated the pressure by sentencing the
Rosenbergs to death.7
Labeled "The Crime of the Century" by FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover, the case was controversial from the start-and not just
because of the couple's subsequent execution.8 The early years of the
Cold War had produced a raft of high-profile espionage cases. A ring
of Canadian spies was exposed by the September 1945 defection in
Ottawa of a Soviet code clerk named Igor Gouzenko.9 Two months
later, Elizabeth Bentley identified a group of federal bureaucrats as
Russian agents, first to the FBI, and then, in the summer of 1948, in
testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee
("HUAC").' ° The exposure of former State Department official
Alger Hiss occurred at the same time. 1 First named as a Communist
by both Bentley and ex-Communist magazine writer Whittaker
Chambers, Hiss sued Chambers for slander, whereupon Chambers
produced a sheaf of typewritten documents that, he claimed, Hiss
gave him for delivery to the Soviet Union.12 It took two trials before
Hiss was finally convicted for perjury-the statute of limitations for
espionage having run-in January of 1950.13 In the meantime, a
Justice Department employee named Judith Coplon was arrested on
a downtown New York City street while in the company of a Russian
engineer with a batch of government documents in her purse. 4 Two
years later, in the spring of 1951, two British double agents, Donald
Maclean and Guy Burgess, fled to Moscow; their colleague, Kim
6. Letter from A.H. Belmont, Assistant Director, FBI, to D.M. Ladd, Assistant
Director, FBI (July 17, 1950), in ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 164 (2d ed. 2002).
7. See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 5, at 284.
8. RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR
HOOVER 558 n.53 (1987).
9. See REG WHITAKER & GARY MARCUSE, COLD WAR CANADA: THE MAKING
OF A NATIONAL INSECURITY STATE, 1945-1957, at 27-56 (1994).
10. See WALTER GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 244-47 (1964).
11. Extensive literature exists on the Hiss case. For the most comprehensive work,
see generally ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE (1997).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. MARCIA MITCHELL & THOMAS MITCHELL, THE SPY WHO SEDUCED AMERICA:
LIES AND BETRAYAL IN THE HEAT OF THE COLD WAR, THE JUDITH COPLON STORY 2-
6 (2002).
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Philby, followed in 1963.'
No doubt, these cases would have become notorious no matter
their outcome. Espionage is, of course, a sensational charge. But,
because both Hiss and the Rosenbergs insisted on their innocence
throughout, and because their cases became immediately politicized,
controversy reigned from the start.16 Since each was convicted on the
testimony of a single witness-Greenglass with respect to the
Rosenbergs, and Chambers with regard to Hiss-there seemed to be
legitimate grounds for doubting the final verdicts.17 The opening of
the FBI's files in the 1970s and 1980s simply exacerbated the
controversy. At that time, it was still possible for partisans of the
accused spies to find flaws in the government's case, given that there
was clear evidence of prosecutorial misbehavior, especially with
regard to the Rosenbergs. 18 It was not until the end of the Cold War
and the release of hitherto secret documents from both the former
Soviet Union and the United States, that the question of their guilt or
innocence was finally laid to rest. While the evidence for the
involvement of Alger Hiss is not quite as solid as that for Julius
Rosenberg and some of the other Russian agents, there is no question
that dozens, perhaps hundreds, of American, Canadian, and British
citizens spied for the Soviet Union before, during, and after World
War 11.19
This Article explores that espionage, but it does so in a new way,
going beyond the traditional discourse of guilt and innocence to place
our recently acquired knowledge in context and assess its meaning.
15. See ANDREW & MITROKHIN, supra note 4, at 157-59, 339; VERNE W. NEWTON,
THE CAMBRIDGE SPIES, THE UNTOLD STORY OF MACLEAN, PHILBY, AND BURGESS IN
AMERICA 41-70, 263-80 (1991); NIGEL WEST & OLEG TSAREV, THE CROWN JEWELS:
THE BRITISH SECRETS AT THE HEART OF THE KGB ARCHIVES 224-26,256 (1998).
16. See LESLIE A. FIEDLER, AN END TO INNOCENCE: ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND
POLITICS 3-24 (1955).
17. See United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (denying
the Rosenbergs' appeal for their conviction of conspiracy to commit espionage).
18. The FBI files on the Rosenberg case reveal that the Justice Department knew that
it had a weak case against Ethel Rosenberg and prosecuted her primarily to put pressure
on her husband. Then, during the trial, the prosecutors colluded with the judge to ensure
that he would impose the death sentence. See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 5, at 98-99,
277-79. For further criticisms of the government's behavior, see WALTER & MIRIAM
SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO INQUEST 119-211 (1965); Victor Navasky, Weinstein, Hiss, and
the Transformation of Historical Ambiguity into Cold War Verity, in BEYOND THE HISS
CASE: THE FBI, CONGRESS, AND THE COLD WAR 215-45 (Athan Theoharis ed., 1982).
19. Hiss's involvement is more difficult to substantiate because he was probably
working for the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency, and not the KGB.
WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 5. As of the time of this writing, that agency's
records have yet to be released.
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What did these people do? What did they think they were doing?
Why did they do it? Unlike later spies, they were not in it for
money. 20 They are, in fact, the only large body of espionage agents in
history whose motivations were entirely ideological and who did not,
it seems, think that they were betraying their country.21 The specific
historical situation within which they acted-the rise of Hitler and the
Second World War-explains much, but not all, of their behavior.
Their political commitments, personalities, and opportunities for
espionage also distinguish this particular cohort. Assessing these
factors should help us understand the multiple loyalties of the dozens
of intelligent and idealistic men and women who willingly entered the
murky world of passwords, cover names, microfilmed documents, and
all the other accoutrements of tradecraft, or konspiratsya, that KGB
operations required.
Part I examines the way in which American counter-intelligence
agencies uncovered and handled information about Soviet espionage.
It focuses particularly on the deciphering of the VENONA cables and
on how the information obtained from them helped the federal
government track down the KGB's American agents. Part II looks at
the operations of the Soviet espionage network. It examines the
recruitment of the members of that network as well as the
interactions between them and their Russian handlers. In addition,
Part II considers the technical aspects of that espionage-the
tradecraft or konspiratsya the KGB operatives tried to get their
American agents to practice. Part III takes up the espionage itself.
What kind of information was the Soviet Union seeking? What kind
of information did it receive? The most valuable materials, of course,
were the nuclear secrets that several physicists transferred from the
American atomic bomb project. But Moscow's other American
agents were equally fecund, transferring thousands of pages of
political and technical data before the KGB's networks shut down
during the early Cold War.22
Part IV addresses questions of loyalty, exploring the complicated
political and personal agendas that motivated the Soviet Union's
American, British, and Canadian agents to spy on their own
governments. Part V concludes the discussion by offering a
preliminary assessment of the significance of that espionage. How
much of an impact did it really have? Though controversy about it
20. See infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 282-309 and accompanying text.
22. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 48,255,270-72.
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still rages in a few quarters, VENONA and the other documents may
have settled the open questions so that historians can turn to other
issues.
I. UNCOVERING ESPIONAGE
There is considerable irony to the story of Soviet spying; after all,
the VENONA project's code-breakers discovered it as a result of the
American government's own undercover work. Beginning in 1939,
the United States Army began intercepting the KGB's messages,
which were sent as ordinary commercial telegrams along with the
Soviet Union's regular diplomatic and commercial correspondence.23
It did not, however, try to decipher these documents until 1943 when
it began to fear that Stalin might make a separate peace with the
Third Reich. 4  The task was daunting, even for the skilled
cryptoanalysts of the Army Signals Security Agency-the precursor
of the National Security Agency-because the telegrams contained
two layers of encipherment: a coded message that was then
encrypted with random numbers taken from a set of "one-time
pads.""5 Although theoretically indecipherable as long as the pads
were used only once, the messages slowly yielded their secrets
because the Soviets had reused some of their pads during the darkest
days of the war.26 By 1946, the American code-breakers realized that
they were reading KGB correspondence, and, within a few months,
they had partially deciphered a message about the Manhattan
Project.27 At that point, it had become clear that the Soviet
intelligence agencies had been running perhaps hundreds of
espionage agents.28 Most agents, however, were mentioned only by
cover names, and, in order to figure out their real identities, the NSA
called in the FBI.29
By 1948, when the Bureau assigned a full-time special agent to
the project, J. Edgar Hoover and his men had been looking for
Russian spies for more than three years.3" Beginning in 1943, the FBI,
23. See JOHN EARL HAYNES & HARVEY KLEHR, VENONA: SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN
AMERICA IN THE STALIN ERA 31 (1999).
24. VENONA, supra note 1, at xii.
25. See HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 23, at 25-28.
26. Id. at 28-29.
27. VENONA, supra note 1, at xxi; NIGEL WEST, VENONA: THE GREATEST SECRET
OF THE COLD WAR 20 (1999) (outlining the discovery of several Soviet spies).
28. VENONA, supra note 1, at xxi.
29. See HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 23, at 36; WEST, supra note 27, at 24.
30. See ROBERT J. LAMPHERE & TOM SCHACHTMAN, THE FBI-KGB WAR: A
SPECIAL AGENT'S STORY 78-79 (1986) (describing his assignment to take charge of the
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which had initially focused on Axis agents, began to pay more
attention to Soviet nationals and their American contacts.3" To
Hoover's dismay, however, few officials outside the intelligence
community evinced much concern about possible KGB penetration of
the federal government.32 For example, President Roosevelt had
ignored Whittaker Chambers's 1939 report on secret Communists
within his administration, while, according to one not entirely reliable
source, President Truman had laughed off a 1945 briefing about the
code-breaking project as "a fairy story. '33 In the face of militant
fascism, Russia and the United States were allies, albeit
uncomfortable ones, and neither Roosevelt nor his successor wanted
to aggravate the already difficult relationship by raising the issue of
Soviet espionage.34
The first concrete indication that there might be widespread
Soviet espionage in North America came with the defection of
Russian cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko in Ottawa on September 5,
1945.35 Recalled to Moscow and fearful of what might await him
there, Gouzenko decided to give himself up to the Canadian
government.36 He prepared for his flight by taking a sheaf of
documents that revealed an extensive network of British and
Canadian citizens who were transmitting materials to the GRU with
the help of the Canadian Communist Party.37 Both in his initial oral
debriefing and in his later testimony before the Royal Commission
investigating his charges, Gouzenko claimed that the Russians had
similar sources within the American government, including "an
assistant secretary of the Secretary of State's Department," but he
supplied neither names nor documents to back up that assertion.38
Since both Washington and Ottawa had yet to become openly
antagonistic to the Soviet Union, news of the case was kept secret and
fragmentary messages); POWERS, supra note 8, at 281-82 (explaining how J. Edgar
Hoover was searching for Russian spies).
31. WEST, supra note 27, at 23.
32. VENONA, supra note 1, at xii, xvii (explaining that federal agencies did not always
follow up on the leads they had or share their information).
33. See JERROLD SCHECTER & LEONA SCHECTER, SACRED SECRETS: How SOVIET
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CHANGED AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (2002).
34. WHITAKER & MARCUSE, supra note 9, at 31.
35. Id. at 30.
36. WEST, supra note 27, at 26.
37. THE GOUZENKO TRANSCRIPTS 142-43 (Robert Bothwell & J.L. Granatstein eds.,
1983).
38. Id. at 10, 136; see also James Barros, Alger Hiss and Harry D. White, The
Canadian Connection, 21 ORBiS 593, 595-96 (1977) (explaining that Gouzenko told
American authorities there were Russian spies close to a deputy Secretary of State).
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became public only in February 1946 when it was leaked to columnist
Drew Pearson.39 Nonetheless, the FBI, which had been immediately
alerted to Gouzenko's defection, assumed that Soviet spies were
operating within the United States, and it intensified its efforts to find
them.4" Ironically, however, Hoover also did not want Gouzenko's
allegations made public; such revelations would highlight an
embarrassing lack of counterespionage vigilance within the American
intelligence community.41
Two months later, the FBI received further information about
the existence of pro-Soviet espionage within the American
government when a thirty-seven-year-old Vassar College graduate
named Elizabeth Bentley described her exploits as a courier for the
KGB:42 she had been recruited into the underground by her lover, a
mid-level American Communist party official named Jacob Golos,
who used her to carry materials from Washington, D.C., to New York
City.43 By the time the Bureau's New York agents finished debriefing
Bentley, she had named more than eighty people who she said were
connected to the Russians' espionage operations.' Most were secret
Communist Party ("CP") members or sympathizers who worked in
the Pentagon, the Treasury Department, and the many temporary
agencies that sprang up in wartime Washington. Her most active
agents, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster and Victor Perlo, ran their own
spy rings, which were later spun off from hers.46 They collected
information from a wide range of federal officials, including the
White House's chief economist Lauchlin Currie and Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White. 47 Though Bentley
mentioned Alger Hiss, whom she originally identified as Eugene, she
had never met him.48
39. THE GOUZENKO TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 37, at 9-11; WHITAKER & MARCUSE,
supra note 9, at 37-59.
40. See VENONA, supra note 1, at xix-xx.
41. See HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 23, at 87-92; WHITAKER & MARCUSE, supra
note 9, at 52.
42. See KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, RED SPY QUEEN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ELIZABETH
BENTLEY 99-100 (2002) (describing Bentley's third visit to an FBI office where she
"decided to tell all she knew").
43. Id. at 36-45.
44. See LAMPHERE & SCHACHTMAN, supra note 30, at 39; Letter from D.M. Ladd,
Assistant Director, FBI, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Nov. 26, 1945) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
45. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 94-103 (providing a comprehensive
portrayal of the spy rings that Bentley serviced).
46. Id. at 157-71, 223-37.
47. OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 48-50.
48. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 316.
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For years, historians and others viewed Bentley as a loose
cannon and had difficulty accepting the veracity of her story.49
Though a recent biographer gamely tried to present her as a kind of
proto-feminist 0 Bentley was clearly an aberrant character whose
heavy drinking, sexual obsessions, and need for attention made both
the KGB and the FBI extremely cautious in dealing with her. 1
Describing one of her reports to his Moscow superiors, one of her
Soviet contacts noted, "[p]ossibly she is making this up and
exaggerating. 5 2 Nearly ten years later, Bentley's FBI handlers were
similarly concerned about her veracity. 3 Nonetheless, while not
confirming every detail of her often changing stories, VENONA and
the Moscow archives establish that Bentley was telling the truth most
of the time.'
Of course, at the time Bentley turned herself in, the VENONA
project had not yet revealed any information about Soviet spying, and
the FBI was scrambling to find evidence to corroborate her story.
Recognizing that, as one FBI official put it, "the Bentley case was the
most important case confronting the Bureau at the present time," the
FBI assigned seventy-two agents to the investigation, put the
principal suspects under surveillance, and interviewed them in the
hopes of obtaining a confession. 5 None of the suspects confessed,
49. For a discussion of Bentley's veracity, see ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF
MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 28 (1994). But see SCHRECKER,
supra note 6, at 33-34 (revising this position in a second edition of the book).
50. See OLMSTED, supra note 42, at x-xi. For Bentley's own account of her
experience as a spy, see generally ELIZABETH BENTLEY, OUT OF BONDAGE: THE
STORY OF ELIZABETH BENTLEY (1951).
51. OLMSTED, supra note 42, at x. But see WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at
97-102 (describing the KGB's concern with Bentley's personal life). An indication of
Bentley's particular obsessions is that almost every one of her first-person accounts-
whether from the KGB, the FBI, or her own memoir--contains a story of someone
coming on to her sexually. See BENTLEY, supra note 50, at 54.
52. See Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 588 (Apr. 29, 1944), in VENONA, supra
note 1, at 261 [hereinafter Letter No. 588].
53. Letter from A.H. Belmont, Assistant Director, FBI, to D.M. Ladd, Assistant
Director, FBI (Oct. 24, 1953) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from J.
Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Communications Section (Oct. 26, 1953) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
54. For documentary evidence of Bentley's veracity, see HARVEY KLEHR ET AL.,
THE SECRET WORLD OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 309-17 (1995); VENONA, supra note 1,
at vii, xxi, xxxiii; WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 97.
55. ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 173
(1998); see OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 102-03; Letter from R.C. Hendon to Clyde Tolson,
Assistant Director, FBI (Nov. 19, 1945) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Letter from D.M. Ladd, Assistant Director, FBI, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Nov.
4, 1953) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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and though a few people were convicted of perjury and contempt, the
government was never able to put Bentley's agents on trial for
espionage.56 It did, however, leak their names to friendly journalists
and congressional investigators, thus ensuring that Bentley's
allegations would get a full public airing, even if the subjects of those
charges were never actually prosecuted. 7 Meanwhile, as the FBI,
which did not want a prosecution, and the Justice Department, which
did, sparred over what to do about the men and women Bentley
identified, the VENONA project was slowly yielding results.58 By the
end of 1952, the decrypted telegrams had not only corroborated much
of what Bentley, the so-called "Blonde Spy Queen," revealed in 1945,
but had also provided information that led to the prosecutions of
Klaus Fuchs, Julius Rosenberg, and Judith Coplon, among others. 9
However, because the FBI could not obtain confessions or
corroborating evidence about some of the other people mentioned in
the VENONA decrypts, their names remained hidden for more than
forty years. 60
VENONA, it turns out, was one of Cold War America's most
tightly held secrets. The project was, in fact, so highly classified that
even the President of the United States was unaware of its existence.61
Though President Eisenhower and some cabinet members may have
been alerted, Truman was never told because the Army Chief of Staff
feared that the White House was too full of leaks.62 Nor, at first, was
the CIA informed; Hoover's turf consciousness succeeded in keeping
the agency out of the loop until late 1952.63 The Russians, on the
other hand, had been aware of VENONA since 194 6 .6 One of their
American agents, a linguist named William Weisband, was working
on the project and, in 1949, Kim Philby, the British Secret Service's
liaison with the American intelligence community, began turning over
56. SCHRECKER, supra note 55, at 173, 237.
57. ATHAN THEOHARIS & JOHN STUART Cox, THE Boss: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND
THE GREAT AMERICAN INQUISITION 250-51 (1988).
58. SCHRECKER, supra note 55, at 233 (describing turf battles between the Justice
Department and the Director of the FBI).
59. VENONA, supra note 1, at xxvi-xxvii.
60. See JOSEPH ALBRIGHT & MARIA KUNSTEL, BOMBSHELL: THE SECRET STORY
OF AMERICA'S UNKNOWN ATOMIC SPY CONSPIRACY 9 (1997) (noting that the secrets
can "finally" be revealed forty years later).
61. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 69-
72 (1998).
62. Id.
63. VENONA, supra note 1, at xxx.
64. MOYNIHAN, supra note 61, at 142-46.
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copies of the decrypts to the KGB.65 The Americans discovered
Weisband's Soviet connections after he was named by an associate.66
He refused to confess, but he went to prison anyway-for contempt
of court, not espionage. 67 A year later, in 1951, Philby came under
suspicion when his colleagues Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess fled
to Moscow.68
Given the Russians' knowledge of VENONA, the Americans'
long-term insistence on secrecy seems hard to understand. Even so, it
does appear that the United States was somewhat more willing to
open Cold War records to researchers than was the former Soviet
Union.69 Most of Moscow's archives still remain closed, though there
were a few years in the early 1990s when outsiders had access to
Soviet materials.7" During that window of opportunity, John Earl
Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and some other scholars managed to obtain
information about the Communist Party's clandestine activities from
the files of the Communist International ("Comintern")71 and the
American party records that had been sent to the Soviet Union for
safe keeping.72 Information also came from the KGB, but that
65. GENRIKH BOROVIK, THE PHILBY FILES: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE MASTER
SPY-KGB ARCHIVES REVEALED 258-66 (1994); MOYNIHAN, supra note 61, at 142-46;
WEST, supra note 27, at 44--46.
66. VENONA, supra note 1, at xxvi, xxviii.
67. Id. at xxviii.
68. See NEWTON, supra note 15, at 327-28; see also MOYNIHAN, supra note 61, at 145
(noting that in May 1951 Maclean and Burgess defected to Moscow); VENONA, supra note
1, at xxv (describing how Maclean and Burgess fled to Moscow in 1951); WEINSTEIN &
VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 336 (explaining that Donald Maclean escaped arrest by fleeing
to Moscow).
69. KLEHR ET AL., supra note 54, at xiii-xv; WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1,
at xv-xvi.
70. KLEHR ET AL., supra note 54, at xiii-xv; WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1,
at xv.
71. Communism was an international movement. FERNANDO CLAUDIN, THE
COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS FROM COMINTERN TO COMINFORM 5 (B. Pearce & F.
MacDonagh trans., Monthly Review Press 1975) (providing a survey of international
communism). Each country had its own Communist party, but because the Soviet Party
actually ran Russia, it dominated the entire movement. Id. It did so through the
Communist International, or Comintern, the body that officially coordinated all the other
parties in the world. Id. Thus, the American Communist Party took its directions from
the Moscow-based Comintern, which was under the control of the Soviet Union. Id. The
KGB was the Soviet Union's secret police and intelligence organization, combining the
functions of both the FBI and the CIA. Id. But there were, as in the United States,
separate military intelligence units like the GRU, about which little is known. Id.
72. See KLEHR ET AL., supra note 54, at xiii-xv. For other studies that utilize these
sources, see generally JAMES R. BARRETT, WILLIAM Z. FOSTER AND THE TRAGEDY OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM (1999); EDWARD P. JOHANNINGSMEIER, FORGING AMERICAN
COMMUNISM: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM Z. FOSTER (1994); VERNON L. PEDERSEN, THE
COMMUNIST PARTY IN MARYLAND, 1919-1957 (2001); JAMES G. RYAN, EARL
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material was less reliable; an American publisher paid an undisclosed
sum of money to obtain access for historian Allen Weinstein and his
Russian collaborator.73 Because those records were only selectively
released and are not available to other scholars, Weinstein's
information, like that of Jerrold and Leona Schechter, who also claim
to have seen "Russian Intelligence Archives," cannot be verified.74
The memoirs of former KGB operatives present similar problems:
some of these accounts may have been designed to score points in
contemporary Russian bureaucratic struggles; but, without archival
corroboration, it is difficult to assess their veracity.75
II. TRADECRAF AND KONSPIRATSYA: THE SPIES AND THEIR
HANDLERS
What all these newly available materials reveal, with a
consistency that reinforces their credibility, is an active global
network of underground Communist agents operating under the
direction of the Comintern and the Soviet Union's intelligence
apparatus.76 Though espionage was certainly one of that apparatus's
primary functions, as were its activities in support of Soviet foreign
policy, it also served as the center of operations for a worldwide
revolutionary movement. A curious blend of idealism, careerism, and
crudity pervaded these endeavors. Communist operatives from
around the world pilfered secret documents from Western
chancellories and ferreted out Trotskyists and other supposed
enemies of the Soviet motherland, but they also struggled against
French imperialism in Vietnam, fought the Japanese in China, and
organized resistance against the Nazis in occupied Europe.77
BROWDER: THE PUBLIC LIFE OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNIST (1997).
73. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at xv.
74. See SCHECTER & SCHECTER, supra note 33, at xxvii; WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV,
supra note 1, at xv.
75. See, e.g., ANDREW & MITROKHIN, supra note 4, at 1 (describing a KGB official's
defection to Britain and the "copious notes" he took on top secret KGB files); FEKLISOV
& KOSTIN, supra note 2, at vi (noting that this source is a "riveting narrative" by Feklisov
of his recruitment and participation in Soviet espionage); PAVEL SUDOPLATOV ET AL.,
SPECIAL TASKS: THE MEMOIRS OF AN UNWANTED WITNESS-A SOVIET SPYMASTER
xii (1994) (defending use of "personal reminiscences" of defectors).
76. For a comprehensive treatment of the KGB's activities, see WEINSTEIN &
VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 1 (providing a "narrative history of major Soviet intelligence
operations in the United States during the Stalin era"); WEST, supra note 27, at xii
(describing the VENONA decrypts and the clandestine activities of the KGB between
1940 and 1948).
77. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 30 (describing Alexander
Feklisov's maintenance of a clandestine radio link). See generally WILLIAM J. DUIKER,
HO CHI MINH: A LIFE (2000) (describing Communist resistance to French rule in
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Believing that they belonged to "a world fraternity,"7 8 some
Americans had plunged into this Communist underground during the
1930s, taking advantage of the protection provided by their American
passports as they conveyed cash and secret instructions between
Moscow and such trouble spots as Shanghai, Berlin, and
Johannesburg. 9 Even in the United States, where the risks, though
not entirely negligible, were less serious, Communists often operated
secretly, while the party, under orders from Moscow, maintained a
separate clandestine organization that not only helped the
Comintern, but also maintained an underground infrastructure that
could function if the party was ever outlawed.8" Though it was by no
means the dominant element within American communism, this
shadow structure fostered an aura of conspiracy that permeated the
movement and may well have eased the passage into espionage for
the men and women who would later work for the KGB.
Because of their successes during World War II, it is tempting-
though wrong-to view the KGB and its military counterpart as
supremely efficient espionage machines. Personality conflicts, turf
battles between the various intelligence agencies, and, above all, the
Moscow purges seriously crippled the Soviet espionage apparatus.8'
In short, the KGB devoured its own. During the height of the purges,
so many of its most effective operatives disappeared into the cellars
of its Lubyanka headquarters that there were no KGB or GRU
representatives in the United States from 1938 to 1941. 2 Once the
Soviet Union entered World War II, a new cadre of professionally
trained KGB officers was sent to the United States; by the end of
1941, thirteen of them were operating out of New York City.83 Some
were "legals"-members of official Soviet delegations, protected by
Vietnam in the early twentieth century); ALLAN MERSON, COMMUNIST RESISTANCE IN
NAZI GERMANY (1985) (giving an account of Communist resistance to Nazi dictatorship).
78. AL RICHMOND, A LONG VIEW FROM THE LEFT: MEMOIRS OF AN AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY 129 (1973).
79. See generally PEGGY DENNIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN
COMMUNIST 72-87 (1977) (describing Communist activities in Europe, Asia, and South
Africa); STEVE NELSON ET AL., STEVE NELSON: AMERICAN RADICAL, 137-52 (1981)
(describing a trip to Berlin where he carried secret documents to a contact); RICHMOND,
supra note 78, at 129 (describing Richmond's activities as a youth in the 1930s).
80. KLEHR ET AL., supra note 54, at 20-70.
81. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 153-55. During the 1930s, Stalin
eliminated thousands of his rivals and potential rivals. For an account of these purges, see
generally ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: A REASSESSMENT (1990).
82. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 153.
83. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 47-58.
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their diplomatic status, but also easily tracked by the FBI.' Others
were "illegals"-Russian nationals who lacked that protection and
worked for the Soviet press and trade organizations or else tried to
blend into the American population.' As their workloads increased
and became more technical, they began to specialize. Thus, for
example, within the New York office, which was the KGB's main
station in the United States, Anatoly Yatskov became the conduit for
the atomic spies, while Alexander Feklisov dealt with electronics.86
All took cover names when they dealt with their American contacts.
Thus, Elizabeth Bentley dealt with both "Bill," the illegal operative
Itzhak Ahkmerov who was posing as an American businessman, and
"Al," Anatoly Gromov, or Gorsky, who was posted to the Soviet
Embassy in Washington, while Harry Gold, Klaus Fuchs's courier,
knew Yatskov as "John."87
Relations between the American spies and their Soviet contacts
varied. The purges had created an enormous reservoir of fear and
suspicion, for there was always the possibility that a mistake would be
lethal for an unfortunate KGB operative. As a result, during the late
1930s and early 1940s, Moscow worried constantly about the political
reliability of its agents.8  In September 1939, for example, Jacob
Golos, Elizabeth Bentley's mentor and lover, came under attack
because he was, according to an internal KGB memo, "strongly
suspected of Trotskyite activities."8 9  He should, another official
suggested, "by no means remain in the list of agents in the U.S. Since
he knows a great deal about the station's work, I would consider it
expedient to bring him to the Soviet Union and arrest him." 9° That
never happened, but even people as valuable as the Los Alamos
physicist Theodore Hall and the Cambridge spies Burgess, Maclean,
84. Id. at 58-66.
85. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 32-38, 155.
86. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 57.
87. OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 63. The original text of Bentley's account of her
dealings with the KGB is in her signed statement to the FBI dated November 8, 1945.
Letter from E.E. Conroy, Special Agent in Charge, FBI, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
FBI (Nov. 13, 1945) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). For more examples of
the Soviet operatives' pseudonyms, see ROBERT CHADWELL WILLIAMS & KLAUS FUCHS,
ATOM SPY 198-99 (1987); WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 167.
88. See BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 217-20 (discussing material that led the KGB to
suspect that the Cambridge ring was supplying disinformation); WEST & TSAREV, supra
note 15, at 159 (describing the KGB's concern with the Cambridge ring).
89. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 90. "Trotskyite" was a derogatory
term used by Communists to label the followers of Stalin's rival, Leon Trotsky.
90. Id.
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and Philby, came under suspicion.91 Much of this distrust originated
in the Moscow home office; at the ground level, if one is to believe
the testimony of former agents, and their handlers, the relationships
could be quite warm.92 Philby, for example, became so close to his
first Russian contact that he claimed, "I sometimes felt that we had
been friends since childhood."93 The reasons were obvious. Who else
could a spy talk to? As Philby later explained:
[Ijt's very important for an agent.. . surrounded by danger and
people in front of whom he has constantly to play a role, to
know that he can unburden himself, speak his mind from time
to time, and get not only professional advice but advice on the
many problems which arise only because he lives the double or
even triple life of a spy.94
Julius Rosenberg and his handler Feklisov formed a similarly intimate
bond.95
Before friendships could develop, however, the Russian
spymasters had .to make sure that the men and women with whom
they were working shared their political ideology and commitment to
the survival of the Soviet Union. The hazards surrounding the
espionage business and the KGB officers' lack of familiarity with
Western society made it imperative for them to seek the cooperation
of the local party in recruiting and vetting potential spies.96 And they
got it from Earl Browder, the head of the American Communist
Party, no less. Between 1933 and 1945, Browder recommended
several dozen people to the Soviet intelligence agencies.97 By 1944,
his duties as a talent scout had become so onerous that he delegated
the task to a lower-level official who worked directly with the
Russians.9  A similar arrangement existed in Canada, where,
Gouzenko noted, "The Communist Party is the base from which
91. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 164-65; ANDREW & MITROKHIN, supra
note 4, at 118-21; BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 217-20; WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at
159-66, 229.
92. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 33; FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 117.
93. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 33.
94. Id. at 175 (quoting Kim Philby).
95. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 117.
96. See Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1328 (Sept. 15, 1944),
http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/Sept44/15-Sep-1944_R3-m4_pl.gif [hereinafter
Letter No. 1328] (describing Earl Browder's role in evaluating potential spies) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); see also KLEHR ET AL., supra note 54, at 295, 307-
08, 313-14 (inquiring about American citizens and potential allies).
97. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 305-06.
98. See Letter No. 1328, supra note 96 (showing Browder's evaluation of sources sent
to Moscow through an intermediary).
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these agents work, the base for their activities."99 The difficulties that
the KGB's New York station chief had in trying to recruit people who
were not in the party made him realize that "[w]ithout the help of the
FELLOW COUNTRYMEN [Communist Party] 'we are completely
powerless.' "'I However, not every espionage agent came directly
from party headquarters. Some, like Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall,
walked in off the street-though both had been Communists in their
student days.' Others were recruited by their friends. Kim Philby
recalled that his first assignment on joining the Soviet underground
was to bring his Cambridge colleagues into it."° Julius Rosenberg
was a particularly energetic talent spotter; he enlisted half a dozen of
his left-wing City College pals. 3
For obvious reasons, the Soviet intelligence officials were
cautious about recruiting new agents and did not want to enlist
someone without verifying his or her political reliability. The
Moscow files contain numerous letters from the KGB to the head of
the Comintern requesting reports on the backgrounds of American
party members. °4 The Russians also checked out their potential
operatives directly with the CP and, in at least one instance, with a
small Communist-led labor union.105  The opinions of trusted
American agents were solicited as well. The New York station
transmitted Elizabeth Bentley's "impressions" of a new group of
federal employees as "reliable FELLOW COUNTRYMEN [Party
members], politically highly mature; they want to help with
information."'0 6 Julius Rosenberg claimed that his friends, Ann and
99. THE GOUZENKO TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 37, at 139.
100. See Letters from New York to Moscow, Nos. 1433-35 (Oct. 10, 1944) [hereinafter
Letters Nos. 1433-35], in VENONA supra note 1, at 350.
101. See WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 15-16, 47; ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL,
supra note 60, at 51-61, 89-99.
102. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 41-49.
103. See Letters from New York to Moscow, No. 1053 (July 26, 1944), No. 1600 (Nov.
14, 1944), in VENONA, supra note 1, at 301, 365 (showing Rosenberg's recruitment of
friends Elitcher and Hughes); Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1491 (Oct. 22, 1944),
http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/Oct44/22_Oct-1944-Rl.gif [hereinafter Letter No.
1491] (describing possible recruitment of another friend of Rosenberg's) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 110, 149
(discussing the importance of the Rosenberg network and Rosenberg's recruitment
efforts).
104. KLEHR ET AL., supra note 54, at 292-321.
105. See Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1340 (Sept. 21, 1944), in VENONA,
supra note 1, at 341-42 (reporting that one potential recruit had a questionable reputation
among some union members).
106. Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 687 (May 13, 1944), in VENONA supra
note 1, at 281.
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Michael Sidorovich, were "devoted and reliable people."' 7 If it could
be arranged, the KGB operatives themselves would vet the
candidates. 08 The New York station chief explained in early 1945
that Judith Coplon "gives the impression of being a serious person
who is politically well developed and there is no doubt of her sincere
desire to help us." 109 The Soviet journalist who was Theodore Hall's
initial contact with the KGB gave a similar assessment: "HALL has
an exceptionally keen mind and a broad outlook, and is politically
developed."" l0
Given the wartime situation and the relatively amicable relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the
Communist Party's Popular Front line and predominance within the
American left, it seems not to have been too difficult for the KGB to
recruit people."' Nonetheless, there are a few, but only a few,
indications that not everyone the Russian operatives approached was
willing to enlist.' 2 It remains unclear how many such individuals
there were; it stands to reason that the KGB officers in America
would not necessarily have told their superiors about prospects who
never developed. Still, it is known that an abortive attempt was made
to enlist the scientific head of the atomic bomb project, J. Robert
Oppenheimer, who seems to have been near, if not in, the Communist
Party during the late 1930s.113 There were other physicists at Los
Alamos with similar political backgrounds, but with the exception of
Fuchs and Hall, none of them gave secrets to the Russians."1
107. Letter No. 1491, supra note 103.
108. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 205-07 (exemplifying the Soviets' desire to
evaluate candidates independently by their interest in contacting agents directly).
109. Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 27 (Jan. 8, 1945) [hereinafter Letter No.
27], in VENONA, supra note 1, at 403, available at http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docsl
Jan45/08_Jan_1945_R3-m4_pl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
110. Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1505 (Nov. 12, 1944), in VENONA, supra
note 1, at 363-64.
111. The Popular Front was a policy of having Communist parties around the world
ally themselves with other parties in opposition to fascism.
112. See FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 71, 151; NEWTON, supra note 15, at 34;
Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 801 (Oct. 6, 1944), in VENONA, supra note 1, at
347-59; Letters Nos. 1433-35, supra note 100 (describing unfulfilled assignments due to
lack of cooperation and suggesting the reluctance of some contacts to become spies).
113. See GREGG HERKEN, BROTHERHOOD OF THE BOMB: THE TANGLED LIVES
AND LOYALTIES OF ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, ERNEST LAWRENCE, AND EDWARD
TELLER 29-32 (2002) (describing Oppenheimer's circle of Communist friends and his
association with a group of colleagues who were perhaps Communists); see also
WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 183-85 (discussing failed attempts to recruit
Oppenheimer).
114. Oppenheimer's brother Frank was among the Communists and ex-Communists at
Los Alamos, as were some of his friends and students, including David Hawkins and Philip
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Moreover, since the San Francisco station chief was recalled to
Moscow in 1944 for failing to recruit Manhattan Project scientists, it is
likely that Oppenheimer was not the only potential source who
refused to spy.115
Recruitment, however, was only the first step. The KGB
operatives worried constantly about the security of their operations,
fearful that an overly enthusiastic agent might inadvertently sabotage
the project or that a disillusioned one might intentionally do so by
going to the FBI.116 Initially, procedures were somewhat lax, in large
part because the British, Canadian, and American counter-
intelligence organizations were not much of a threat.117 As one of the
people identified by Gouzenko explained,"8 " '[S]ecurity measures
were so childish they were practically non-existent. There was not a
locked door anywhere.' "119 He did not, he claimed, even hear the
term "security" mentioned until May 1945.120 Things tightened up
somewhat earlier in the United States. As the FBI increased its
surveillance over the Russian delegations after 1943, security became
an obsession for the Soviet operatives."2 ' Because they assumed that
their homes and offices were bugged, KGB officers did not use
people's real names, and wrote notes to each other instead of
speaking. 2 2 They also took elaborate precautions whenever they met
their local contacts-first following what Feklisov called a "security
Morrison. See ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE
UNIVERSITIES 35, 38-39, 56, 138, 401 n.41 (1986) (discussing Robert Oppenheimer's
former students and his brother).
115. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 184.
116. Id. at 97-101; Letter from Moscow to New York, No. 709 (July 5, 1945)
[hereinafter Letter No. 709], in VENONA, supra note 1, at 441; Letters from Moscow to
New York, Nos. 284, 286 (Mar. 28, 1945) [hereinafter Letters Nos. 284, 286], in VENONA,
supra note 1, at 415-17.
117. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 100-07 (discussing lapses in security at
Los Alamos); NEWTON, supra note 15, at 18-19; WEST, supra note 27, at 94 (concerning
security lapses at England's MI5); WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at 149-54 (discussing
further inadequate security at MI5).
118. MERRILY WEISBORD, THE STRANGEST DREAM: CANADIAN COMMUNISTS, THE
SPY TRIALS, AND THE COLD WAR 140-45 (1983).
119. Id. at 132.
120. Id.
121. See FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 58 (giving examples of worried Soviet
operatives' reactions to FBI surveillance); Letter from Moscow to Canberra, No. 233
(Dec. 2, 1943) in VENONA, supra note 1, at 247.
122. The declassified VENONA files contain notes sent between Moscow, New York,
and other locations that go back many years. Throughout the letters, KGB agents use
secret names and discuss instructions for their American operatives. See generally
VENONA, supra note 1 (providing a compilation of translated messages containing secret
names).
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itinerary" to elude FBI surveillance, then hopping on and off subways
and buses, ducking into storefronts, and passing documents in the
back rows of darkened movie theaters. 23 Of course, these measures
did not always work. For example, when Judith Coplon was arrested
in lower Manhattan with a stash of Justice Department documents in
her purse, she and her Soviet contact, Valentin Gubitchev, had been
leading a posse of FBI agents all around the city for several hours.124
The KGB's main problem was the sloppy tradecraft or
konspiratsya, as it was called,'125 of their American contacts.126
VENONA and the Moscow files are full of lamentations about the
security lapses of these men and women-their incorrigible habits of
attending left-wing meetings, talking about their activities with each
other, and recruiting people without getting permission from
Moscow. 127 Elizabeth Bentley and her boyfriend, Jacob Golos, were
among the worst offenders. A marked man after he was convicted for
failing to register as a foreign agent, Golos refused to surrender his
agents. Bentley, who inherited Golos's contacts after he died in
November 1943, was equally troublesome.28 Her carelessness and
her "unbalanced state" of mind so upset her handlers that, at one
123. See FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 54, 124 (describing obsessions with
security and a secret meeting in a cafeteria); see also WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note
1, at 189 (concerning intense surveillance of agents by the United States government);
Letters from Moscow to Canberra, Nos. 233,232 (Dec. 2, 1943), in VENONA, supra note 1,
at 247 (discussing concerns about secrecy and recommending security measures); Letter
from New York to Moscow, No. 1047 (July 2, 1943), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/
venona/docs/July43/02 Jul_1943 _m3.gif (illustrating Communist agent's notice of
surveillance) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
124. MITCHELL & MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 2-6; see also Transcript of Record at
439-70, 478-507, United States v. Coplon (D.D.C. 1949) (No. 381-49), 439-70, 478-507
(1978) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
125. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 163.
126. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 90-103, 225-30 (discussing Soviet
frustrations with American operatives Jacob Golos, Elizabeth Bentley, and Victor Perlo).
127. See, e.g., FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 123, 132-33 (illustrating risks
taken with personal friendships and frustrations with nervous American spies); Letter No.
709, supra note 116 (showing concern about the poor quality of some agents' work for the
Soviets and agents' disobedience of orders); Letters from Moscow to New York, Nos. 179-
80 (Feb. 25, 1945), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/Feb45/25_Feb_1945_R3-pl.gif
(explaining that some members of spy networks were widely known) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Letter from Moscow to New York, No. 292 (Mar. 29, 1945),
http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/ docs/Mar45/29_Mar_1945_R3_mlpl.gif [hereinafter
Letter No. 292] (stating that another group's composition was widely known) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 561 (Jul. 18,
1944), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/ docs/July44/18_Jul_1944_R3p2.gif (canceling a
meeting due to permanent surveillance of an operative) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
128. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 90-100.
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point, they even considered finding a husband to keep her happy. 129
A few months later, they wanted to smuggle her out of the United
States, but, realizing that she " 'won't go anywhere voluntarily and
she may damage us here very seriously, only one remedy is left-the
most drastic one-to get rid of her.' "130 Before they got around to
implementing that suggestion-they were actually planning to buy
her off instead-she had gone to the FBI. 3' But even the KGB's
more stable contacts created anxiety. A March 1938 directive reveals
something of the KGB's constant struggle to transform these all-too-
individualistic men and women into effective agents.'32 Though the
directive noted that one of the Russians' new recruits " 'may be a
very valuable source, he must be taken care of and, most important,
EDUCATED, made our man, have his brains rebuilt in our
manner.' "133
Moscow expected its agents to turn over original documents; it
considered notes and oral reports to be little more than hearsay.134
Documents, however, created serious problems: they were bulky and
hard to conceal. As a result, the Russians encouraged their agents to
photograph the materials themselves and transmit the undeveloped
films to their handlers. 135 That way, if a courier or spy were picked up
by the FBI, he or she could destroy the incriminating evidence by
simply exposing the film. Unfortunately, not all of these agents were
competent photographers, and the Moscow archives and VENONA
cables contain several complaints about unreadable documents. 36
Ludwig Ullmann, Gregory Silvermaster's main photographer, was so
129. Id. at 98-99.
130. Id. at 102.
131. Id. at 102-08.
132. Id. at 78; see WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 227-29 (discussing lessons
regarding compartmentalization and tradecraft); Letters from Moscow to Canberra, No.
142[a] (Sept. 12, 1943); Letters Nos. 284, 286, supra note 116 (showing struggle to keep
operatives from meeting each other and stop them from sharing confidential information);
Letter No. 292 supra note 126 (illustrating failed efforts to keep the composition of an
American network secret).
133. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 78.
134. See NEWTON, supra note 15, at 39 (discussing Stalin's demand for reports
substantiated by facts and sources); WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at 11 (illustrating
concern over speculative reports from operatives).
135. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 77-79; see Letter from New York to
Moscow, No. 1715 (Dec. 5, 1944) [hereinafter Letter No. 1715], in VENONA, supra note 1,
at 385; Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 736 (May 22, 1944), http://www.nsa.
gov/docs/venona/docs/May44 /22_May_1944_Rl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 976 (July 11, 1944), http://www.nsa.
gov/docs/venona/docs/July44/ll_ Jul_1944_Rl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
136. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 163.
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inept that half of his films did not come out.137  Kim Philby was
another bumbler; he had been given a camera, but his pictures turned
out so badly that his handlers took the camera back.3 s Moreover, as
the networks grew and produced more and more material, they
caused considerable strain on the people who were managing them.
By the end of 1944, Julius Rosenberg's handlers had begun to worry
about his workload: "LIBERAL [Rosenberg] ... has on hand eight
people plus the filming of materials. The state of LIBERAL's health
is nothing splendid. We are afraid of putting LIBERAL out of action
with overwork.'
'1 39
As the KGB came to realize, the career of an agent was stressful.
Given the tensions of the double life, the constant fear of exposure, as
well as the unremitting pressure from Moscow for better documents
and more careful tradecraft, it is surprising that more people did not
defect from the Soviet spy network. A few did, Whittaker Chambers
most notoriously. 14 Several government employees, who had been
sporadically supplying documents, began to worry about being
caught.' After begging off from further assignments, one of them,
according to his American contact, was " 'totally frightened and
depressed. He suffers from nightmares where he sees his name on
the lists [presumably of accused Communists within Office of
Strategic Services ("OSS")], his life is destroyed, etc.' "142 The man
met his contact two more times, but Moscow was told he "'came so
scared to both meetings that he could not hold a cup of coffee since
his hands trembled.' "I" Harry Gold was also scared, but he felt, so
he told the FBI, that "I was in so deep that I was, to a certain extent,
bewildered and didn't know what to do."'" Elizabeth Bentley was
neither scared nor overworked but she had been squabbling with her
Soviet handlers for years.'45 Concerned about her sloppy security
procedures, they had been trying to wrest agents away from her
137. See id.
138. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 206.
139. Letter No. 1715, supra note 135.
140. See generally SAM TANENHAUS, WHITTAKER CHAMBERS: A BIOGRAPHY
(1997) (describing Chambers's years as a spy, his defection from the Communist party, his
role as a witness in the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings, and his role
as a witness in Alger Hiss's perjury trials).
141. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 16-17,261.
142. Id. at 260.
143. Id. at 161.
144. WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 202 (recounting Harry Gold's statement to
the FBI on May 22, 1950).
145. See OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 21, 44-45, 62, 65, 68-79; WEINSTEIN &
VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 97-102.
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influence. 46 Bentley was not unique in this regard-the KGB sought
direct control over all their spy networks, a heavy-handed tactic that
no doubt reflected the political climate in Moscow as well as its
operatives' fears of exposure. 47 In Bentley's case, it backfired. On
November 8, 1945, she arrived in the FBI's New York office ready to
tell her story."4
Bentley's betrayal ended what Allen Weinstein and Alexander
Vassiliev have labeled the "golden age" of Soviet espionage. 149
Already reeling from Gouzenko's defection, the Russian intelligence
agencies began to shut down their operations.50 By the end of
November, the KGB had ordered its American officers "to cease
immediately their connection with all persons known to Bentley in
our work [and] to warn the agents about Bentley's betrayal."'' Soon
the key Soviet operatives were on their way home, and their carefully
nurtured espionage networks fell into disarray. 5  Though a few of
the most zealous agents, like Julius Rosenberg, tried to keep working,
their Russian handlers were no longer around. 53 Arriving early in
1946 without either contacts or instructions, the KGB's new
Washington station chief could barely speak English.1 54 After a year,
he cabled Moscow:
I feel that my knowledge of English has sharply improved. I
read American newspapers almost without a dictionary,
translate serious articles from English into Russian, and can
talk with an American about any subject. Still, I consider [my
knowledge of English] insufficient, especially in fluent
conversation on everyday topics. 155
He had no agents and based his intelligence reports on published
146. See OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 59, 64-65.
147. See Letters from New York to Moscow, Nos. 1388-89 (Oct. 1, 1944), in VENONA,
supra note 1, at 343-46 (illustrating efforts to control Gregory Silvermaster's network).
148. See OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 89-101; Elizabeth Bentley, Statement, Nov. 8,
1945, in Letter from E.E. Conroy, Special Agent in Charge, FBI, to J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, FBI (Nov. 13, 1945) [hereinafter Bentley Statement] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Letter from D.M. Ladd, Assistant Director, FBI, to J. Edgar
Hoover, Director, FBI (Nov. 26, 1945) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
149. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 340-41.
150. See id. at 105-09.
151. Id. at 105.
152. See id. at 107, 285-89.
153. See id. at 105-07, 222.
154. See id. at 288-89 (describing station chief Dolbin's unsuccessful stint in
Washington).
155. Id. at 289.
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sources. 156  His successors did no better. Old networks were
destroyed by Bentley, and it proved impossible to recruit any new
informants. 57 By the beginning of 1951, the KGB had but a single
agent in the United States: an open member of the Communist Party
who was writing a book about world peace. 5 8 A few months later,
when Julius and Ethel Rosenberg went on trial, the Soviets had no
functioning American agents at all.159
III. WHAT THE SPIES STOLE: THE FRUITS OF ESPIONAGE
In order to assess the issues of loyalty that are central to
understanding why so many men and women worked for the Soviet
Union and what they thought they were doing, it is important to
consider what their efforts produced. Were they influencing policy or
only providing information? Moreover, although thousands of pages
of documents entered the KGB's pipeline, except for those dealing
with nuclear weapons, little information exists explaining how that
material was utilized once it reached Moscow. Again, with the crucial
exception of nuclear weapons, that lack of knowledge means that
there is no way at present to determine the significance of the actions
of these Soviet agents."6° Still, an overview of their activities and their
contributions to the KGB's trove of information is the first step
toward assessing their impact.
Despite the flood of materials they received from their American
sources, the Russians were dissatisfied. A September 1943 dispatch
from the New York station chief complained about the lack of agents
"with distinguished status capable not only of explaining matters in
which we are interested but influencing affairs in a direction desirable
for us."'' There was considerable irony here, for during the height of
the McCarthy period, when the anti-Communist furor was at its peak,
the most politically damaging allegation about the government's
supposed softness on communism was not that federal employees had
spied for the Soviet Union, but that they had subverted American
foreign policy.162  Senator McCarthy was only one of many
156. Id. at 286-87.
157. Id. This was due to the recent defections of key agents Bentley and Gouzenko.
Id.
158. Id. at 299.
159. See id. at 286, 334.
160. See BRUCE CRAIG, TREASONABLE DOUBT: THE HARRY DEXTER WHITE SPY
CASE 135-55 (2004) (noting that there is little information about how the material the
Soviet Union gained from espionage was used).
161. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 228.
162. For a more comprehensive discussion of such charges, see SCHRECKER, supra
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Republican politicians and other opponents of the Roosevelt and
Truman Administrations who claimed that high-level officials had
sold out their country's interests. 163 The substance of their charges
centered on (1) Yalta, where it was alleged that Communists within
the State Department had surrendered Eastern Europe to Stalin,"
and (2) China, where a similar cabal had supposedly undermined
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government.'65 These charges were
baseless. 166  Given the larger historical forces involved-the Red
Army's occupation of the future Soviet bloc nations and the ongoing
Chinese civil war-no matter who determined American policy, the
United States could not have prevented the Communist take-overs. 167
In addition, there was no evidence at the time, or in the more recently
released documents, that Communist agents or sympathizers had
subverted United States foreign policy. Even so, the charges
continued to fester. 168
These charges focused primarily on those individuals who, unlike
most of the Soviet agents, had some access to policy-making circles:
Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and Lauchlin Currie.1 69 Hiss had
been at Yalta and had helped to organize the United Nations 70 but he
handled administrative matters, not political ones.'71 Thus, while it
appears likely that he conveyed information to the Soviets, he was in
no position to determine policy. White and Currie, however, had
more influence. White, an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
handled international financial matters and was responsible for
constructing the Bretton Woods monetary system that dominated the
note 55, at 63-65.
163. See generally DAVID OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OF
JOE MCCARTHY (1983) (describing the charges made by McCarthy against many in the
Administration); THOMAS REEVES, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOE MCCARTHY (1982)
(describing the charges made by McCarthy).
164. ATHAN THEORHARIS, THE YALTA MYTHS: AN ISSUE IN U.S. POLITICS, 1945-
1955, at 21 (1970).
165. ROSS Y. KOEN, THE CHINA LOBBY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 171 (1974).
166. Id. at 100, 171.
167. See THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR xiv-xv (Robert J. McMahon & Thomas G.
Paterson eds., 1999); JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1800-
1985, at 240-69 (1986).
168. For a study of some charges regarding the loss of China to the Communists, see
generally HARVEY KLEHR & RONALD RADOSH, THE AMERASIA SPY CASE: PRELUDE
TO MCCARTHYISM (1996).
169. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
170. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 312-15. (discussing Hiss's roles and
contributions during and after the war).
171. Id.
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Western economy after the war. Currie, also an economist, worked
in the White House as Roosevelt's chief economic advisor.'73 Bentley
mentioned both men in her November 1945 statement to the FBI,
174
as did Chambers," - and their names appear in the VENONA
decrypts.176
Currie's involvement seems more tenuous than that of either
Hiss or White. His biographer has examined the available evidence
and determined that it was inconclusive. 77 Currie knew Gregory
Silvermaster and some of the other people in the Silvermaster spy
ring. They were all government economists and some-Currie,
George Silverman, and White-had been at Harvard together.78 But
the VENONA texts that mention Currie are incomplete and do not
indicate anything more than that he had discussed government policy
with his friends and gave documents to Silvermaster. 79 It is also
important to note that the official stance of the White House during
the war encouraged cooperation with the Soviets. Currie was
simply following that policy.
181
VENONA and the Moscow files implicate Harry Dexter White
172. CRAIG, supra note 160, at 135-55.
173. See ROGER J. SANDILANDS, THE LIFE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAUCHLIN
CURRIE: NEW DEALER, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR, AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIST 96
(1990).
174. OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 101-02.
175. TANENHAUS, supra note 140, at 246-47.
176. Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 900 (June 24, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/
docs/venona/docs/june44/24 Jun 1944_R3_pl.gif [hereinafter Letter No. 900] (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
177. See Roger J. Sandilands, Guilt by Association? Lauchlin Currie's Alleged
Involvement with Washington Economists in Soviet Espionage, 32:3 HIST. POL. ECON. 473,
511-12 (2000).
178. CRAIG, supra note 160, at 70, 159; SANDILANDS, supra note 173, at 15.
179. See Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1028 (June 30, 1943), http://www.nsa.
gov/docs/venona/docs/une43/30 Jun_1943_ml.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1317 (Aug. 10, 1943), http://www.nsa.
gov/docs/venona/docs/aug43/10Aug_1943.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Letter No. 900, supra note 176; Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1243
(Aug. 31, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/aug44/31-Aug-1944_R3-pl.gif (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from Moscow to New York, No. 143
(Feb. 15, 1945), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/feb45/15_Feb-1945_R3-p1.gif
[hereinafter Letter No. 143] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from
Moscow to New York (Mar. 20, 1945), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/mar45/
20_Mar_1945R3_pl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
180. John Kenneth Galbraith was a friend of Currie's in Washington. In a letter to
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more deeply. 182  One 1944 message, in particular, relates a
conversation with an as yet unidentified operative that makes it clear
that White was aware of the delicate nature of his relationship with
the Soviets.
As regards the technique of further work with us JURIST
[White] said that his wife was [B% ready] for any self-
sacrifice[;] he himself did not think about his personal security,
but a compromise [PROVAL] would lead to a political scandal
and [B% the discredit] of all supporters of the new course [c],
therefore he would have to be very cautious. 183
As this and other documents reveal, White had clandestine
contacts with Soviet representatives and may well have discussed
economic and political issues with them." White's biographer, Bruce
Craig, characterizes these admittedly unauthorized contacts as "a
species of espionage," but considers them part of a broader project
designed to promote Allied unity and aid in the war effort at a time
when the Roosevelt administration's fear of arousing criticism made a
more open relationship difficult.'85
Whatever the new documents show about the Soviet connections
of people like Currie, White, and Hiss, the charges that they
subverted American policy are hard to sustain. The most recent
allegations against White, made by a former KGB official, claim he
helped bring on World War II in the Pacific by carrying out Moscow's
orders to create antagonism between Japan and the United States
over China and thus divert Tokyo from attacking Siberia. 186 Since
Roosevelt and his advisors also strongly supported China's struggle
against Japan, White's actions in facilitating loans to Chiang Kai-shek
were in keeping with official policy, and, as a mid-level Treasury
official-he was not yet an Assistant Secretary-he was hardly a key
player.'87 White has also been accused of the reverse, withholding
182. Bruce Craig, a leading authority on the White case, concluded that White was
implicated in some kind of espionage. CRAIG, supra note 160, at 256-62.
183. Letter from New York to Moscow, Nos. 1119-21 (Aug. 4-5, 1944) in VENONA,
supra note 1, at 319-24 (alteration in original).
184. Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 590 (Apr. 29, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/
docs/venona/docs/apr44/29_Apr_1944 R3m4_pl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 83 (Jan. 18, 1945), http://www.nsa.gov/
docs/venona/docs/jan45/18_Jan_1945_R3m3.pl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
185. CRAIG, supra note 160, at 180-85 (quoting J.W. PICKERSGILL, THE MACKENZIE
KING RECORD 8 (1960-1970)).
186. See SCHECTER & SCHECTER, supra note 33, at 3-44.
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funds from Chiang Kai-shek in order to help the Communists. 18
Here, again, although he did try to delay the loans, he was acting in
accord with the wishes of his superiors./9 (Currie faced similar
accusations -bui hi roI in China, where he functioned as FDRs
man on the spot.19°  Ironically, though, he was actually quite
supportive of the Nationalist government he was later charged with
subverting. 91) The one area in which White determined policy was
post-war financial arrangements, but it would be a stretch to claim
that the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, his most important achievements, undermined American
interests on Moscow's behalf.192 White may have tried to help the
Soviet Union negotiate favorable terms for a post-war loan, but since
the loan was not completed, it is hard to see what difference his
activities made. 93 Nor, despite later allegations to the contrary, were
his apparently reluctant contributions to the punitive, and abortive,
Morgenthau plan to deindustrialize Germany designed to help the
Russians.194
What the Russians did want, and what well-placed individuals
like White and Currie could sometimes supply, were government
positions for other members of the Soviet underground. Elizabeth
Bentley explained to the FBI that, "In connection with the activities
of HARRY WHITE, it was apparent to me from conversations I
heard in the SILVERMASTER home, that one of his most valuable
assets ... was his ability to place in the Treasury Department those
individuals whom the group was anxious to have assigned there."' 95
VENONA and the Moscow archives corroborate Bentley's
recollections, indicating as well that when people like Gregory
Silvermaster and his associate Ludwig Ullmann ran into trouble,
White and Currie helped them keep their jobs.'96 Conspiratorial
188. See id. at 193-94.
189. See id. at 191.
190. SANDILANDS, supra note 173, at 107-25.
191. Id. at 114-21.
192. See CRAIG, supra note 160, at 155 (noting that postwar international financial
institutions advanced several important American objectives).
193. See Letter No. 588, supra note 52; Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 79 (Jan.
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194. CRAIG, supra note 159, at 167--69, 176-77.
195. Elizabeth Bentley, Statement, Nov. 30, 1945, in Thomas G. Spencer, Summary
Report, Dec. 5,1945 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
196. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 23, at 132 (stating how with the help of Currie and
White, Silvermaster was able to obtain a position on the Board of Economic Warfare); see
also WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 161-62 (stating that Currie helped quash a
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motives may have been involved, but it is also possible that the two
officials recommended and protected these people because, as Bruce
Craig pointed out, Silvermaster, Ullmann, and the others were highly
trained and competent economists whose talents were much needed
in World War II Washington. 19 7 At that time, there would have been
no incompatibility between friendship, professionalism, and left-wing
politics.
Still, there is no question that espionage occurred. Craig likens
Silvermaster and the other Soviet agents to a sponge, absorbing
enormous amounts of undifferentiated information and transmitting
it directly to their contacts. 98 The Russians, it turned out, were eager
for almost any kind of material. During the early 1930s, they were
looking for scientific and economic secrets that would be useful for
their industrialization.'99 They also wanted to learn about German
and Japanese intentions with regard to the Soviet Union.2"' After
Pearl Harbor, they sought information about American war plans,
prospects for a second front, and possible negotiations for a separate
peace.210 "What questions did Churchill discuss with Roosevelt... at
their last meeting in June? What are the divergences between the
English and Americans on the main matters of the war? ' 20 2 Moscow
wanted information from the inner circles of the administration. The
KGB was:
interested in the [U.S.] government's plans for the country's
foreign and domestic policy, all machinations, backstage
negotiations, intrigues, all that is done before this or that
decision of the government becomes known to everybody ....
The task is to penetrate into those places where policy is born
and developed, where discussions and debates take place,
where policy is completed.2 3
Later, they sought information on post-war planning, the
German economy, and what the United States government thought of
Justice Department inquiry of Silvermaster).
197. See CRAIG, supra note 160, at 83-85 (offering an extended discussion of how what
he calls "the Econ-umists" got hired).
198. See Bruce Craig, Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Case, 1948-1954,
at 593 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, American University) (on file with the
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Russia.2°4 Much of the time, Moscow got what it wanted. Bentley's
contacts within the Treasury Department, the OSS, and elsewhere
supplied quite a lot of political intelligence. This intelligence included
the high-level gossip the KGB claimed to be most interested in--
reports that the Secretary of State was miffed at being bypassed by
the president, that United States policy-makers were worried France
might turn Communist, that the United States and Britain disagreed
about their occupation zones in Germany, and so on.2 °5
Moscow also sought scientific and technical, as well as political,
information.216  Its main wartime coup was obtaining information
about the atomic bomb. Klaus Fuchs and the Cambridge spies had
alerted the Soviets to the project in the fall of 1941, and from then on
tracking its progress became a top priority.2 7 Amazingly, despite
what seems to have been a vigorous effort to infiltrate the Manhattan
Project, the KGB's two main sources, Fuchs and Hall, approached the
KGB of their own initiative,28 while another, Julius Rosenberg's
brother-in-law, was serendipitously assigned to the Los Alamos
machine shop.2 9 Alan Nunn May, a British physicist identified by
Gouzenko, turned over a tiny amount of enriched uranium;210 and
there seem to have been other people involved with the bomb who
204. Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 220 (Mar. 11, 1945), http://www.nsa.gov/
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from New York to Moscow, No. 847B-848 (June 15, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/
venona/docs/ june44/15_Jun_1944_R3_ml-pl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Letters from New York to Moscow, Nos. 1105-10 (Aug. 2-3, 1944), in VENONA,
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were working with the Soviet intelligence agencies, but they have not
been identified. a1
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, the KGB's
successor organization, which was eager to retain its previous
influence, began to churn out stories about its atomic exploits. 12 At
the same time, the Russian scientific community, caught up in a
similar power struggle, sought to downplay the role of espionage in
the Soviet nuclear weapons program.213 These competing narratives
have muddied the story, though it is known that because of Stalin's
desire to develop a bomb as soon as possible, the Russians created an
exact replica of the American plutonium bomb.214  The Russian
scientists claim that they could have produced their own, better,
weapon within a year or two regardless-but, thanks to Stalin and the
KGB, they never got the chance.215
Much less is known about other scientific secrets that Moscow
received. Even before Julius Rosenberg recruited his City College of
New York classmates, quite a few people were sending technical
information to the Russians. 16 These operations pre-dated World
War II and seem to have been extensive. By 1943, the New York
station alone was running twenty-eight chemists, biologists, and
engineers.217  A scientifically literate courier like Harry Gold, who
211. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 64.
212. For examples of propaganda, see Vladimir Chikov, How the Soviet Intelligence
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weapons development); Roald Sagdeev, Russian Scientists Save American Secrets, BULL.
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could understand at least some of the technical details of the
materials he was collecting, was essential to the Soviets, and they
actually paid for a year of the Philadelphia chemist's graduate
education."' Bef-e he dc-aii -ooi y LA) atuiiiii,. i,-age, Gold
had been involved with industrial spying, collecting material from
agents throughout upper New York State.1 9 Unlike the ideologically
motivated men and women Bentley worked with in wartime
Washington, many of these industrial spies were in it for the money.2 °
Others, like Julius Rosenberg, were true believers whose
opportunities for espionage expanded enormously with the growth of
the defense industry during the war. According to Alexander
Feklisov, Rosenberg's network, which specialized primarily in
electronics and aeronautics, supplied over 20,000 pages of material as
well as a* 12,000-page manual for the first American jet plane.2
Rosenberg's people were not the only Soviet agents to obtain such
"highly valuable" technical information.2 22  The Canadian chemist
Raymond Boyer turned over a formula for the explosive RDX; John
Cairncross, one of the Cambridge spies, forwarded information about
the thickness of German tank armor; and Silvermaster sent copies of
pilot's operating instructions for several army and navy warplanes-
just to give a few examples.223
These people delivered military intelligence as well, alerting the
Soviets to the size of the German units they faced, for example, and
providing detailed figures for American airplane production.224
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North Carolina Law Review); Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1327 (Sept. 15,
1944), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venonaldocs/sept44/15-Sep1944_Rl-p1.gif (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
222. Letter from Moscow to New York, No. 305 (Apr. 1, 1945) (on file with author).
223. See BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 217; WHITAKER & MARCUSE, supra note 9, at
72-73; Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 918 (June 28, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/
docs/venona/docs/June44/28_Jun_1944_R3_m4_pl.gf (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
224. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 253; Letters from New York to
Moscow, Nos. 678-82 (May 14, 1942), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/May42/
14_May1942 -pl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letters from New
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Situated within the British intelligence agencies, the Cambridge spies
offered particularly useful data, even if, as with the information about
Hitler's plans to invade Russia, the recipients did not always use it
well.2" Elizabeth Bentley gives us some idea of the scope of the
Soviet spying. Her agents, she explained to the FBI at an early
debriefing, provided:
All types of information. At the beginning, it was mostly
political data, which was fished out of the Treasury. In those
days [Silvermaster] picked up whatever memos came to
[Secretary of the Treasury] Morgenthau, and found out what
there was. Things about the British and Americans ganging up
on the Russians, that type of thing. But then, as the war went
on and LUD[wig Ullmann] got in where he was and
SILVERMAN moved into the Pentagon Building as a civilian
employee of the Air Corps, they began to get all this
tremendous amount of data .... Practically all the WPB [War
Production Board] progress reports. Practically all the Ministry
of Information in London's monthly reports. Some FBI
reports. A monthly report on Red activities in this country.
They used to get ahold of Navy Intelligence things, Army
Intelligence things .... They had everything under the sun ....
They'd go in for production figures of all varieties-how many
planes are going here and there and so on.226
VENONA and the Moscow files corroborate this account. They
contain detailed lists of the information that came from the
Silvermaster and Perlo groups as well from Bentley's independent
agents in the OSS and elsewhere-thousands of pages of material on,
as she put it, "everything under the sun. '227
Though the torrent slowed to a trickle after Bentley confessed, a
few key agents remained on the job. Until VENONA decrypts
York to Moscow, Nos. 746-48 (May 25, 1942), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/
May42/25_May_1942.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from New
York to Moscow, No. 1003 (July 18, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/
docs/July44/18 Jul_1944_R3_pl.gif [hereinafter Letter No. 1003] (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 735 (May 21, 1943),
http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/May43/21-May-1943-pl.gif [hereinafter Letter No.
735] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
225. BOROVIK, supra note 65, passim; WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at 155-56, 168-
70, 212-14, 220.
226. Bentley Statement, supra note 148.
227. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 232, 253-56, 270-72; Letter No.
735, supra note 224; Letter No. 1003, supra note 224; Letter from New York to Moscow,
No. 1469 (Oct. 17, 1944), in VENONA, supra note 1, at 357; Bentley Statement, supra note
148.
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exposed her late in 1948, Judith Coplon was working in the Justice
Department's Foreign Agents Registration Section, sending the KGB
tidbits from her agency and the FBI.228  Klaus Fuchs, who had
returned to England to work on that nation's nuclear weapons
program, continued to supply information, as did the Cambridge
spies, several of whom had been sent to the United States.229
Assigned to the British Embassy in Washington from 1944 to 1948,
Donald Maclean became, according to former CIA director Richard
Helms, "the most valuable known Soviet agent ever to operate in the
West. '230 He was the embassy's second secretary, in charge of all its
paperwork, and he was in a good position to transmit thousands of
British and American documents to Moscow.231 Even more crucial
was his appointment to the joint British-American committee that
dealt with nuclear matters and his later involvement in helping to
establish NATO. 32 When he returned to London, after his stint in
Washington, he headed the American desk in the Foreign Office.233
The Korean War began during his watch and, as then-Assistant
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, admitted, "It can be assumed, []
anything we in our government knew about Korea would have been
known at the British Embassy. '234  Together with Philby, whose
connections to the American intelligence community enabled him to
warn the KGB about the VENONA decrypts, Maclean presumably
gave Moscow access to the most closely guarded secrets of the
Western Allies.235
But not all of the material the Soviet agents transmitted was
particularly secret. Philby passed on the same information about the
planned invasion of Normandy that Roosevelt and Churchill had
given to Stalin.236 Similarly, according to one not necessarily reliable
Russian source, a new type of machine gun acquired by the American
espionage agents Morris and Lona Cohen was later sent to Moscow
under the Lend Lease program.237  After all, the United States,
228. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 226; WEST, supra note 27, at 245.
229. See FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 204-34; NEWTON, supra note 15, at 96-
124, 244-49, 268-79; WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at 174-82, 239-45; WILLIAMS &
FuCHS, supra note 87, at 100-01, 110, 191-94.
230. NEWTON, supra note 15, at xv.
231. Id. at 66-67.
232. Id. at 147-84, 195-97.
233. Id. at 284.
234. Id. at 286.
235. See id. at 67-210, 286; BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 258; WEST, supra note 27, at
45-46.
236. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 223.
237. Chikov, supra note 212, at 37.
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Britain, and the Soviet Union, were allies and during the war, despite
Stalin's distrust and paranoia, both the British and the Americans
shared technology and intelligence with Moscow. That cooperation
was, however, rather grudging, with Washington and London
sometimes being less than forthcoming. Especially within the
military, traces of the West's long-standing hostility to the Bolshevik
revolution impeded a more open policy.238 In addition, the British
were afraid that material they sent to the Soviet Union might fall into
German hands. For that reason, they did not let Moscow in on the
most important intelligence achievement of World War II-the
ULTRA code-breaking project 3.2 9  They did, however, sometimes
share the results of those intercepts.24 Had there been less fear and
hostility, the Soviet Union might well have received much of the non-
nuclear information it got from espionage through regular channels.
IV. DIVIDED LOYALTIES: WHY THEY SPIED
Although the Soviet Union was officially an ally, both the
American and British governments kept it at arm's length. Thus, the
men and women who transmitted unauthorized information to
Moscow were caught up in a web of conflicting loyalties. Or were
they? In order to unravel that web, it is necessary to know, among
other things, what they thought they were doing.
Were they, in fact, aware that they were spying for the KGB?
Some spies, like Lauchlin Currie, may have been consciously
sheltered from that knowledge. 241  The VENONA decrypts that
describe Currie's activities seem to imply that he was not entirely
witting.242  Nor was he unique. Elizabeth Bentley and her lover,
Golos, purposely kept their agents unaware of the destination of their
materials, fearing that their more skittish sources might bolt if they
knew that their information was going to Soviet intelligence agencies
238. See BRADLEY F. SMITH, SHARING SECRETS WITH STALIN: How THE ALLIES
TRADED INTELLIGENCE, 1941-1945, at 172-74, 128 (1996).
239. See id. at 42-45. ULTRA was a top-secret British project that used early
computers to break German codes.
240. See id. at 45-47; ANDREW & MITROKHIN, supra note 4, at 95-96.
241. See SANDILANDS, supra note 173, at 480-81, 500-05 (offering a plausible reading
of the VENONA decrypts and other materials that makes the case that the KGB probably
kept Currie out of the direct espionage loop, even though it is clear he was giving
information to people who were definitely directly involved).
242. See id.; Letter No. 143, supra note 179; Letter from Moscow to New York (Mar.
28, 1945) (wondering whether to approach Currie directly and whether to bring up
questions of his closet complicity with Silvermaster) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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instead of party headquarters in New York.243 Over time, that
deception wore thin. By early 1944, if not before then, Silvermaster
at least understood for whom he was working.244 He was, his KGB
handler reported, "a man sincerely devoted to the party and the
Soviet Union ... politically literate, knows Marxism, a deeply Russian
man ... known in Washington as a progressive liberal ... [and]
understands perfectly that he works for US. ' 245  But some of
Silvermaster's sources were considerably less informed. Frank Coe,
for example, apparently thought he was reporting to the American
party.246
Other people knew their documents were being sent to Moscow,
but may not have realized that the KGB was the recipient. Though
the Russian operatives wanted their contacts to know they were
working for the Soviet Union, neither VENONA nor the Moscow
archives indicate they were told for what organization they were
working.2 47 As one KGB official reported to his superiors about an
inexperienced espionage recruit in 1937: " 'He has very little
experience and sometimes behaves like a child in his romanticism.
He thinks he is working for the Comintern, and he must be left in this
delusion for a while.' "248 Even agents as sophisticated as Kim Philby
and Morris Cohen initially thought that they, too, were in a
Comintern operation, not a KGB one.249 Eventually they realized the
truth, as no doubt, other agents did. When a member of Victor
Perlo's group discussed the matter with one of his handlers, he said
that Perlo had told him that " 'he was not passing materials to
[Browder] anymore but was passing them to us.' "250 Who that "us"
was-the Soviet Union or the KGB-remains unclear. But,
according to his interlocutor's report, the man "apparently was very
proud of this fact, which contradicts [Bentley's] opinion that everyone
will immediately stop working if they find out about the connection
with us. Seemingly, one way or another, they already know about
it." '251 As did some other spies. "[I am] not a child," Treasury official
Abraham Glasser told his Soviet contact, "[and I] realize exactly
243. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 84-85.
244. See id. at 162.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 162-63.
247. Id. at 162.
248. Id. at 75.
249. See ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 31; BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 46-
47.
250. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 237.
251. Id.
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where and to whom [my] materials have been going for several
years. ''11 2 Coplon also knew who her handlers were. At first, she told
one of them she thought she was working for the Communist Party
U.S.A. ("CPUSA"). 253 However, she figured out "that the nature of
the materials in which we are interested pointed to the fact that it was
our country which was in question. She was very satisfied she was
dealing with us. 254  Again, did she think she was dealing with
ordinary Russian officials or intelligence operatives? Repugnant as
the KGB may seem today, to dedicated American Communists the
identity of their conduit to Moscow may not have mattered much as
long as it helped them do their bit for the Russian war effort.
What is hardest to understand, however, is how these men and
women managed to rationalize what they were doing in the face of
the Stalinist terror of the 1930s. 5 Most of them, especially the agents
recruited during the mid-1930s, were ardent Communists, accustomed
to the party's top-down style of decision-making and convinced of the
need to support the Soviet Union.25 6 Thus, their clandestine work
simply reinforced their sense of discipline. In an interview after his
arrest in 1950, Klaus Fuchs recalled that when he was in the German
underground in the early 1930s, he " 'was ready to accept the
philosophy that the Party is right and that in the coming struggle you
.could not permit yourself any doubts after the Party had made a
decision.' ,257 The Moscow trials, however, gave some of the Soviet
agents second thoughts; a few wondered whether they should run so
many risks for a regime that they had begun to question.258 In 1937,
for example, the State Department official, and Soviet spy, Lawrence
Duggan expressed his uneasiness about the purges.259 According to
his handler, he was afraid that he might be exposed by a fascist spy
within the KGB and was reluctant "to work for a country where
something happens that he does not understand. ' '26 Nonetheless, he
swallowed his doubts and continued to supply intermittent scraps of
252. Id. at 266.
253. Id. at 266, 277-78.
254. See Letter No. 27, supra note 109.
255. See generally CONQUEST, supra note 81 (providing an overview of the Stalinist
terror).
256. See BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 27-28; FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 108-
09, 118-20.
257. WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 182 (recounting Klaus Fuchs's interview
with William Skardon on January 27, 1950).
258. See WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 12-15. The Moscow trials led to
the sentencing and subsequent execution of many of the Soviet Union's top leaders.
259. See id. at 13.
260. Id.
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information.2 6' The available sources are mute about the response of
other KGB agents and agents-to-be. Some may have accepted the
trumped up charges, believing as did Peggy Dennis, the wife of a
leading American Communist then living in Moscow, that:
We did not know the extent of those purges, but we cannot
claim we did not know what was happening. We knew that the
Comintern had been decimated. We read of the public trials.
True, we read in silence, puzzled and uncomprehending, but we
read the accounts and we accepted them. We saw it as part of
the brutal realities of making revolution, of building an oasis of
socialism in a sea of enemies. We accepted the belief of
infallibility of our leaders, the wisdom of our Party. Facts and
claims to the contrary were rejected as the very proof of that
anti-Sovietism that demanded the vigilance Stalin urged.262
Other Communists who, unlike Dennis, did not have to confront
the disappearances of people they knew, found it easier to ignore
than to rationalize the purges. Julius Rosenberg's handler, Alexander
Feklisov, claims that Rosenberg never raised the topic. 263 Michael
Straight, a wealthy American recruited by the Cambridge network,
describes the willful ignorance to which he and his colleagues
subscribed:
Only the hardened party members were prepared to argue that
the confessions of Stalin's new-found enemies were genuine.
The rest of us simply refused to think about the trials. We
would not peer into the dark recesses of the Kremlin while
Russia was arming itself against Hitler and sending arms to
Spain.26
A certain kind of cognitive dissonance seems to have been at
work here, as well as an ingrained suspicion of the capitalist press.
Like many dedicated Communists, Klaus Fuchs had long discounted
Western reports about Russia, believing that they "could be
deliberate lies."2 65 Theodore Hall, his fellow atomic spy, had a similar
reaction:
"In 1944 1 did not realize the nature and scale of the atrocities
261. See Letters from New York to Moscow, Nos. 1025, 1935-36 (June 30, 1943),
http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/June43/30_June43/30 Jun-1943_m2-pl.gif (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
262. DENNIS, supra note 79, at 117-18.
263. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 119.
264. MICHAEL STRAIGHT, AFTER LONG SILENCE 90 (1983).
265. WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 183.
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perpetrated in the Soviet Union during and after the 1930s ....
Many reports about these things had been proved false, and
they seemed incompatible with the obvious dedication of the
Soviet Army and people during the war. If I had seen the
whole picture in focus, I feel quite convinced that I would have
acted differently .... On reflection ... I think my emotional
revulsion against Stalin's terror would have stopped me in my
tracks. Simple as that. 266
Of course, it was not that simple. Nonetheless, though the
purges may have prompted some quiet soul-searching, they did not
produce many defections-or at least not many public ones.
Moreover, the people who did break with Moscow at that time, like
Whittaker Chambers, were motivated less by revulsion against the
terror than by the fear that they might be swept up in it.
Since most of the men and women who spied for the Soviet
Union signed on because they wanted to fight fascism, the 1939 Non-
Aggression Pact between Hitler and Stalin that split Poland between
Germany and the Soviet Union and precipitated World War II in
Europe, was more disturbing. Michael Straight, who was increasingly
uncomfortable with his undercover work, responded to that event by
breaking his connection with the KGB.267 Even as staunch a believer
as Kim Philby recalls his confusion, as well as the fear that the Soviet
Union might share some of his information with the Third Reich.268
Yet, as with the purges, most of the spies-like most ordinary party
members-suppressed their doubts. "The Russo-German pact was
difficult to understand," Fuchs told his Scotland Yard interlocutor,
"but in the end I did accept that Russia had done it to gain time. 2 69
No matter how devoted they were to the Soviet cause, the
negative connotations of espionage created discomfort for the men
and women drawn into it. William Remington was not "happy about
the whole situation," his ex-wife testified.27 ° "Once he was in, he
wanted to get out. '271 In some cases, the future agents hesitated
before committing themselves fully to underground work. "It was
only after a great struggle on my part," a former Canadian spy
recalled, "that I could bring myself eventually to accept this kind of
266. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 282-83.
267. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 81-83.
268. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 144-49.
269. WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 183.
270. GARY MAY, UN-AMERICAN AcrIVITIES: THE TRIALS OF WILLIAM
REMINGTON 165 (1994).
271. Id.
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work. ' 27 2 When he decided to tell the Russians about the Manhattan
project, Ted Hall explained, "I contemplated a brief encounter with a
Soviet agent, just to inform them of the existence of the A-bomb
project. I anticipated a very limited contact. 27 3 Fuchs was similarly
cautious at first. He planned only to give information about his own
work, not that of others. 274 Recognizing the squeamishness of their
new recruits, the KGB's operatives would often make their early
assignments relatively innocuous-recruiting their friends or checking
out local Nazis. 275 Harry Gold's first task was to steal the process for
keeping ice cream from melting.276
A curious blend of personal and political motives seems to have
drawn this cohort of political activists into espionage. Money,
however, was not a prominent factor. The VENONA decrypts are
full of messages revealing that the Russians wanted to pay their most
productive agents, perhaps as a way of guaranteeing their loyalty.277
While some people took money-Harry Gold, for example, was on a
$100 per month retainer during the early 1940s-others did not.278
Gold recalls that Klaus Fuchs was positively insulted when he offered
him the $1500 the KGB believed he "fully deserve[d]. 27 9 Most of the
agents who accepted Moscow gold took only what they needed to
cover the cost of their undercover work.280 There were other rewards
as well, "valuable gifts" like the oriental rugs Whittaker Chambers
gave Harry Dexter White, Alger Hiss, and George Silverman, or the
medals that Moscow secretly bestowed on Kim Philby, Elizabeth
272. WEISBORD, supra note 118, at 134-35.
273. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 288.
274. WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 189.
275. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 38-46; Chikov, supra note 212, at 40.
276. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 176.
277. See VENONA, supra note 1, at 335; WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at
176-77; Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1314 (Sept. 14, 1944),
http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/ docs/Sept44/14.Sep_1944_R1.gif [hereinafter Letter No.
1314] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from New York to Moscow,
No. 1624 (Nov. 20, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/Nov44/20 20 Nov 1944_
R3_m4_p1.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from Moscow to New
York, No. 200 (Mar. 6, 1945), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/mar45/06_Mar
_1945_Rl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Letter from New York to
Moscow, No. 1052 (July 5, 1945), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/docs/uly45/05_Jul
_1945_R3_mlpl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
278. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 135-36; WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra
note 1, at 177.
279. See WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 199, 212; Letter from New York to
Moscow No. 1049 (July 25, 1944), http://www.nsa/gov/docs/venona/docs/uly44/25-Jul_
1944_Rl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
280. See Letter No. 1314, supra note 277; FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 122;
VENONA, supra note 1, at 335.
2004] 1879
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Bentley, and Gregory Silvermaster, among others.211
But most of the men and women who spied for the Soviet Union
did so for political reasons, as Kim Philby put it, "on the basis of
conviction. '282  They were Communists with connections that
happened to bring them within the purview of the KGB's networks.283
Their recruitment was a chain process; political comrades recruited
each other.284  Whether other party members, given a similar
opportunity, would also have spied for the USSR is something that
will never be known. Still, it seems clear that the espionage agents
had particularly strong political commitments. Kim Philby explained
to an interviewer shortly before his death:
Several factors influenced my decision inner and external,
emotional and rational. The study of Marxism and seeing the
Depression in England. Books and lectures and the rise of
fascism in German. Fascism was one of the deciding factors for
me. I was becoming convinced that only the Communist
movement could resist it. Of course, there were doubts and
unfounded expectations. But there was also dissatisfaction with
myself. I kept asking myself-why not give yourself totally to
this movement? I had only one alternative: either I told
myself, yes, or I gave up everything, betrayed myself, and
dropped politics altogether.285
Rosenberg, if his handler can be believed, was similarly
dedicated, seeing "his collaboration with Soviet intelligence as a kind
of religious calling, which was his way of fighting, indirectly, but no
less effectively, his personal enemy: fascism. '286  Silvermaster was
equally devoted, as he told one of his handlers, and he felt "his work
for us is the one good thing he has done in his life. ' 287 These people
were-or at least saw themselves as-revolutionaries. Morris Cohen,
who was recruited during the Spanish Civil War and ultimately ended
281. See ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 174; BOROVIK, supra note 65, at
249; WEINSTEIN supra note 11, at 189-92; WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 165;
Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1798 (Dec. 20, 1944), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/
venona/docs/dec44/ 20_Dec_1944_R3_m4 p1.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Letter No. 1314, supra note 277; Bentley Statement, supra note 148.
282. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 173.
283. WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at 275.
284. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 41-46; FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 108;
WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at 128-33.
285. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 12.
286. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 120.
287. See Letter from New York to Moscow, No. 1635 (Nov. 21, 1944), http://www.nsa.
gov/docs/venona/docs/Nov44/21_Nov_1944_R3_mlml..pl.gif (on file with the North
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up in Moscow, explained his commitment with a quote from a film
about Robespierre: " 'If you are a revolutionary you don't stop here.
You go to the very end.' That's all. '288 Early in his underground
career, he had promised his superiors that, though he would like to
work in the American labor movement, "if circumstances require my
presence elsewhere, similar to the Spanish struggle against fascism,
then I would go there. ' 29 He did not, it should be noted, think that
he had been a traitor.29 ° Nor did other self-confessed revolutionaries.
Though they realized they had broken the law, as the Canadian
scientist Raymond Boyer put it, "[S]ometimes a revolutionary has to
do illegal things even if he doesn't want to."'291 A colleague of Boyer's
was even more blunt: "We accepted the illegal aspect. It's illegal but
whose law is it: ... the law of the people who double-cross an ally. '292
Ultimately, as we probe the various motivations, opportunities,
and commitments of these Soviet agents, we invariably return to the
unique situation provided by the rise of fascism and World War II.
Of course, there were people who wanted to contribute to the Soviet
experiment in the years before the war. Harry Gold, for example,
began his career of industrial espionage in 1936, because, he claimed,
"I thought that I would be helping a nation whose final aims I
approved, along the road to industrial strength. '293 But, time and
again, it was the war and the perception that a Soviet victory was
absolutely essential to defeat the Nazis that induced these men and
women to spy. As they saw it, reactionary forces within the Allied
governments were withholding desperately needed aid from the
Soviet Union, and, therefore, many believed whatever could help
ensure Soviet victory was not only legitimate, but necessary.2 94 The
Canadian spy, Scott Benning, articulated this sense of obligation: "I
couldn't have lived with myself afterwards if I hadn't done
something."2 9 Another confessed:
[T]here was no choice for a [C]ommunist. It was a situation
where the Soviet Union was bleeding to death and the
government was refusing to give them information that would
help in the development of their own defenses. We just felt
288. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 285.
289. KLEHR ET AL., supra note 54, at 220.
290. See Chikov, supra note 212, at 37-40.
291. WEISBORD, supra note 118, at 130.
292. Id. at 130-31.
293. WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 201.
294. WEISBORD, supra note 118, at 130; WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 184.
295. WEISBORD, supra note 118, at 132-33.
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that anybody in a position to help, would help and should help.
It was as simple as that.296
Neither she nor any of the other Soviet agents thought that they
were betraying their country; they were, after all, working for an ally.
"I did not consider myself a traitor and I still don't," State
Department official Julian Wadleigh declared at the trial of Alger
Hiss.297 He further stated:
I felt that I was doing the right thing. I was acting in
accordance with my convictions as of that time ... I had no
reason to believe any of them [the documents] would or could
be used against the U.S. government because they ... were
going to be used against Germany and Japan .... I was not a
traitor because I never intended to injure the U.S .... The
main objective was the Nazis and other aggressive powers in the
world. I felt the Soviet Union was the only power that was
actually resisting the expansion of the Fascist and reactionary
powers.298
The Canadian chemist Raymond Boyer made the same point.
He passed on information because without it the Soviet Union
was not as efficient, as effective an ally as it could have been
.... Today we know we won the war, but the end of 1942 was a
low point.... We were losing everywhere. German subs were
sinking almost all the ships on the way to the front. The Nazi
army was on the Volga. The United States hadn't even started
to get going. Victory was a long way from assured.299
Helping the Russians, he claimed, "didn't imply any kind of
betrayal."3" Harry Gold made the same point: "I felt that as an ally,
I was only helping the Soviet Union obtain information that I thought
it was entitled to."3 1 William Remington's ex-wife offered the same
justification for his wartime spying. "After all," she explained, "we
were allies with the Russians at that time, and it wasn't so dreadful,
perhaps, in trying to give them secrets over the heads of the
Governments.""3 2 Significantly, the Loyalty Review Board that was
296. Id. at 130.
297. CRAIG, supra note 160, at 400 n.55 (quoting the Wadleigh testimony) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
298. Id.
299. WEISBORD, supra note 118, at 131.
300. Id. at 132.
301. WILLIAMS & FUCHS, supra note 87, at 202.
302. MAY, supra note 270, at 165.
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assessing Remington's case33 in 1949 agreed: "Our government's
attitude toward Russia in 1942 was such that giving the Russians
information with respect to the progress of our war effort wouldn't
necesril y spell disloyalty."3" Ironically, the KGB held the same
belief during the early years of the war. It suspected Philby and the
other Cambridge spies of being double agents because the
information they were sending to Moscow did not harm British
interests. 05
To a certain extent, Philby, Remington, and the rest may have
convinced themselves that they were serving the Allied war effort by
furthering the Russian one.3°6 But they were also working within an
ideological framework that eschewed conventional patriotism. They
saw themselves as internationalists, as citizens of a larger polity.3"7
This polity was centered in Moscow, it is true, but they believed it
encompassed the entire world. In some very concrete way, these
people saw themselves as belonging to what one American
Communist called:
[T]he nascent world brotherhood of man. It made you one with
the peoples you read about on the onionskin pages of
International Press Correspondence (Inprecor), a news service
publication of the Communist International, and the more
remote they were from you in space and sociological time the
greater the thrill in the sense of kinship with them. A mutiny
aboard a Dutch cruiser in waters off the Dutch East Indies, a
strike of diamond miners in South Africa, peasant uprisings in
French Indochina-you came upon such events in Inprecor, not
as a distant observer, but as allied combatant. 308
For such people, prevailing conceptions of national loyalty had
little meaning. As Julius Rosenberg's handler noted about his agents:
Their homeland was not the United States or Great Britain, but
the World itself and their compatriots were all the inhabitants
of the earth. It is in the name of this community for the
common good that they shared secrets with us that appeared
303. Under the Truman Administration's loyalty-security program, if federal
employees were charged with disloyalty and threatened with dismissal, they could appeal
their cases to a specially constituted Loyalty Review Board. ELEANOR BONTECOU, THE
FEDERAL-LOYALTY SECURITY PROGRAM 54-60 (1953).
304. MAY, supra note 270, at 129.
305. BOROVIK, supra note 65, at 217-20.
306. Id. at 224; WEISBORD, supra note 118, at 130-32.
307. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 66.
308. RICHMOND, supra note 78, at 126-27.
2004] 1883
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
too dangerous to be held by one side alone. 0 9
Though the internationalism the Soviet spies espoused was
hijacked by the Soviet Union, it is an ideal that offers an attractive
alternative to traditional forms of patriotism. Embraced by the
contemporary political philosopher Martha Nussbaum,
internationalism, or cosmopolitanism, as she prefers to call it, honors
"the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of
human beings. "310
The tragedy here is that during the late 1930s and 1940s some of
the people who shared that conception of a "worldwide community"
implemented it by sharing secrets with the intelligence services of a
brutal, tyrannical regime. They managed to convince themselves that
their espionage was, as one Canadian agent put it, "something that
would, in the long run-I was conscious that it would be a long run-
advance the whole cause of international co-operation."3"' Theodore
Hall had a similar explanation for his collaboration with the KGB: "I
felt myself to be part of a broad democratic front. These actions were
undertaken at a time before the beginning of the Cold War, and I saw
myself as part of the political front insisting on peaceful and
harmonious relations between the peoples of these states. '312
Scientists, perhaps because they already had more international
contacts than most other people, were particularly prone to this kind
of reasoning.313  Still, it is important to realize that the
internationalism of the scientific community did not have to lead to
espionage. There were other physicists like Niels Bohr and Leo
Szilard who also believed that the best route to a lasting peace was to
share atomic secrets with the Soviet Union.314 However, unlike Hall
and Fuchs, they sought to achieve that goal and prevent a disastrous
arms race by trying to influence policy-makers, not by working with
309. FEKLISOV & KOSTIN, supra note 2, at 66.
310. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 4 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Joshua
Cohen eds., 1996).
311. WEISBORD, supra note 118, at 134.
312. See ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 90; Joan Hall, Theodore Hall: A
Personal Historical Perspective 10 (Apr. 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
313. LAWRENCE S. WITTNER, ONE WORLD OR NONE: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT THROUGH 1953, at 23-26,157-60 (1993).
314. For a description of the efforts of Bohr and others to prevent an arms race, see
WILLIAM LANOUETIE & BELA SILARD, GENIUS IN THE SHADOWS: A BIOGRAPHY OF
LEO SZILARD xvi-xix (1992); MARTIN J. SHERWIN, A WORLD DESTROYED: THE
ATOMIC BOMB AND THE GRAND ALLIANCE 6-8 (1975).
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the KGB.315
Why then did Ted Hall spy while other former Communists at
Los Alamos did not? Can we find some kind of psychological factor
that can explain why certain individuals chose to act above the law
and engage in what they knew was a clearly illegal transfer of
unauthorized information? Though a few of these people were
probably aberrant, most of the others seemed to live more or less
normal lives. One personal characteristic that many of the Soviet
spies shared 316 was a strong streak of anti-authoritarianism. Given the
standard portrayal of individual Communists as Stalinist puppets who
blindly followed the Kremlin's orders, finding such a personality trait
among the Russian agents would be surprising, to say the least. Yet,
time and again, the sources reveal a common pattern of people who
were self-assured, independent, even arrogant. Harry Dexter White,
according to his biographer, had a "propensity to question
authority." '317 Alger Hiss was viewed as "a strong, determined man
with a firm and resolute character. ' 318 Ted Hall also appears to have
been, in the words of friends and family members, a "free-thinking,
iconoclastic" individual, "a natural-born rebel. ' 319  Hall himself
admitted he was "far too sure of [him]self."3 20 William Remington
took an equally independent path. His ex-wife admitted: "We were
not orthodox Communists in that sense of following all the rules ....
We were Communists as much as we wanted to be."' 321 The couple
established contact with Bentley on their own, thus ending up as,
albeit reluctant, KGB informants.322  A similar strand of self-
assurance characterized Bentley's other agents as well. Silvermaster
was typical-his later Soviet handler described him "as a man wholly
devoted to us but exceptionally self-willed, stubborn, confident of his
superiority over all others and behaving with respect to other [agents]
as a dictator or 'fuhrer.' ",323 Already conditioned by their Communist
affiliations to consider themselves outside the system and convinced
that they had a superior understanding of the world, these people
315. See LANOUETTE & SILARD, supra note 314, at xvi-xix; SHERWIN, supra note 314,
at 6-8.
316. I must admit to considerable hesitation with regard to offering any kind of
psychological explanation for what was a primarily political set of motives.
317. CRAIG, supra note 160, at 400 n.58.
318. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 268.
319. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at 83.
320. Id. at 289.
321. MAY, supra note 270, at 215.
322. See id. at 69-70.
323. WEINSTEIN & VASSILIEV, supra note 1, at 165-66.
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decided to act on their own, even if that meant breaking the rules.324
V. How MUCH DID SOVIET ESPIONAGE REALLY MATTER?
The extent to which these espionage agents' actions affected the
course of history remains an open question. Obviously, they did not
bring about the better world for which they hoped. No matter how
idealistic its aims, espionage alone could not ease the deepening
tensions between the Soviet Union and the West during the 1940s,
and it may well have made them worse. Certainly, the Russian
intelligence agencies' single most important achievement, obtaining
the secrets of the atomic bomb, sped up Moscow's acquisition of
nuclear weapons, but only by about two years.3 25 All the authorities,
both then and now, recognize the competence of the Soviet scientists
and estimated that, even without the information from Fuchs and
Hall, the Soviet Union would have become a nuclear power within
five years after the United States' bombing of Hiroshima.326
Nonetheless, it is possible that the information that enabled the
Russians to detonate the bomb in the summer of 1949 may have had
an impact on world events. It could have been, at least in part,
responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War in the sense that it
gave Stalin the confidence to approve Kim I1 Sung's plan to invade
South Korea the following year.327 On the other hand, some believe
that the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons actually
stabilized the world balance of power.328 Theodore Hall, who had no
324. See OLMSTED, supra note 42, at 55. Their actions, we now know, were to destroy
their lives. Such was quite literally the case for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and William
Remington, who was murdered by a fellow prisoner while he was serving a sentence for
perjury in Lewisburg penitentiary. MAY, supra note 270, at 307-19. Many others avoided
prison, but nonetheless, often found themselves ostracized, evicted from the American
mainstream, with their formerly promising careers in tatters. Some responded by leaving
the country, and seeking new lives in places where their past exploits were either unknown
or, as with the people who went to the Soviet bloc countries, rewarded. See, e.g., HAYNES
& KLEHR, supra note 23, at 201 (describing Flora Wovschin's escape to the Soviet Union
where she later married a Russian); WEST & TSAREV, supra note 15, at 226 (describing
how one of the Cambridge spies fled England, living in Geneva, Rome, and France). But
even an exile like Theodore Hall, who managed to escape public notice until the very end
of his life, lived that life darkened by the fear of exposure and punishment. HALL, supra
note 312, at 12.
325. HOLLOWAY, supra note 214, at 366.
326. See id.
327. See id.; see also ZUBOK & PLESHAKOV, supra note 214, at 62-63, 150 (discussing
the factors that led Stalin to believe the United States might not invade South Korea).
Mao Zedong's triumph in China was, most historians agree, a far more important factor.
Zubok, supra note 214, at 62-66.
328. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at xiv-xv; John J. Mearsheimer, Back to
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regrets about what he did, speculated that the end of Washington's
nuclear monopoly in the late 1940s may have prevented the United
States from using the bomb against the Chinese Communists in 1949
or the early 1950s.329
Nuclear espionage, however, is in a class by itself. Very little is
known about the final disposition of the other information Moscow
received. Presumably, some of the technical material provided by
Julius Rosenberg and others was of value. However, it is not known,
for example, whether the information about jet engines that
Rosenberg's agents supplied was as useful as the information that the
Soviet Union obtained from captured German scientists at the end of
the war.330 On the other hand, it does appear that the intelligence
gleaned from the ULTRA decrypts that the Cambridge spies
transmitted helped the Russians win the battle of Kursk in 1943. 33'
As for the reams of material that Bentley's agents sent about
American aircraft production or the state of the German economy in
1945, scholars simply do not know how it was used. Did it increase or
lower Stalin's suspicions of his wartime partners? Did Stalin even
receive it? Philby foiled attempts to foment anti-Soviet movements
inside eastern Europe, but there seems to be a consensus that those
movements would have failed in any event.332  The post-war
intelligence that Donald Maclean fed the KGB was probably more
important.333 Though some historians view his espionage activities as
nothing less than sabotage, they also admit that those activities may
have helped defuse the 1946 crisis unleashed by Stalin's demand to
control the Turkish straits, since they let Moscow know that Truman
was prepared to back up his objections with force.334 But did Stalin
factor that information into his decision-making? Similarly, did the
jealously guarded knowledge about the limited size of the United
States atomic stockpile, which Maclean must have also sent to
Moscow, encourage Stalin to impose the Berlin blockade and take
other risks? It is simply unknown and probably unknowable.
the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, 15 INT'L SECURITY 5, 6-7 (1990).
329. ALBRIGHT & KUNSTEL, supra note 60, at xiv-xv, 288; HALL, supra note 312, at
11.
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CONCLUSION
This information indicates that spying does not invariably
damage national interests. Secrecy, after all, impedes
communication; a more open atmosphere on both sides might well
have dissipated some of the hostility and suspicion that poisoned
Soviet-American relations during the height of the Cold War.335
While the Kremlin's atomic espionage was clearly deleterious, a
different case could be made with regard to the political and military
intelligence conveyed during and after World War II by the likes of
Philby, Maclean, and Harry Dexter White. Not only could it have
contributed in some small way to the Allied victory over Germany,
but it is also possible that during the tensest moments of the early
Cold War, the insights into United States policy-making that these
agents supplied may have provided what Vojtech Mastny calls a
"critical margin of stability" by ensuring that the Russians did not
miscalculate American intentions. 6
Finally, because of the inherent fascination of espionage, is it
possible that its importance is being overestimated? After all, spying
is, as one historian recently noted, what nation-states ordinarily do.337
Did the activities of Maclean and Philby, Harry Dexter White, Alger
Hiss, and Gregory Silvermaster change the history of the world
between the 1930s and the 1950s? Would the Soviet Union have
collapsed, or Stalin have moderated his policies, or the United States
have gained the upper hand in determining the post-war fate of
Eastern Europe or China if that espionage had not occurred?
Nothing revealed thus far in the new sources available in Washington
or Moscow establishes any credible basis for making such an
argument. It may, in fact, be time to look at something else. The past
decade's revelations have resolved the matter of guilt and innocence,
leaving only the deeply contentious issues of loyalty and disloyalty
that loom so ominously over the recent discourse about Communism,
anticommunism, and the Cold War.338 Since it is now known why and
335. For a lengthy disquisition on the baneful effects of secrecy during the Cold War,
see MOYNIHAN, supra note 61, passim.
336. VOJTECH MASTNY, THE COLD WAR AND SOVIET INSECURITY: THE STALIN
YEARS 196 (1996). For a specific example of a confrontation that espionage may have
defused, see NEWTON, supra note 15, at 98.
337. Jessica Wang, Scientists, McCarthyism, and the Specter of Atomic Espionage:
Then and Now 3 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
338. See, e.g., ANN COULTER, TREASON: LIBERAL TREACHERY FROM THE COLD
WAR TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM passim (2003) (resuscitating the theory that American
liberals abetted Soviet spying and subversion); see also JOHN EARL HAYNES & HARVEY
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how so many men and women spied for the Russians, the remaining
questions are moral and political ones-and they lie outside the realm
of historical scholarship.
KLEHR, IN DENIAL: HISTORIANS, COMMUNISM & ESPIONAGE 2-9 (2003) (claiming that
"progressive" historians are tainted by their denial of the reality of Communist
espionage).
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